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KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD: AN APPRECIATION

BY BELL IRVIN WILEY

On October 10, 1958, Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield retired from the position of Chief Historian, Department of the Army. The day before, in a ceremony at the Pentagon attended by the Honorable Hugh M. Milton, Under Secretary of the Army, General L. L. Lemnitzer, Vice Chief of Staff, and other high officials, Dr. Greenfield received the highest honor that the Department of the Army can bestow on a civilian employee; namely, a Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service. At the ceremony the following citation was read.

... he has been outstandingly successful in establishing and maintaining the highest standards of scholarship in historical works prepared and published by the Army. Under his inspirational leadership as Chief Historian and as General Editor, the Army has produced an historical series of unprecedented scope, *THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II*, that will have profound impact on American military and public thought and action for many decades to come.

After pinning the medal on Dr. Greenfield, General Lemnitzer pointed up the uniqueness of the World War II history supervised by the Chief Historian, called attention to the enormous labor and exceptional skill required to produce the series, praised the high quality of the books and emphasized the enduring value which they have for the Army. Mr. Milton then commended Dr. Greenfield for directing a work which he characterized as one of tremendous importance not only for the Army but also for more than 160,000,000 Americans.

In the room in which the ceremony was held, thirty-eight volumes of the *History of the U. S. Army in World War II* were displayed. These handsome, green books were

all published during the incumbency of the retiring Chief Historian. Eleven more volumes of the series are in press and scheduled for publication within the next year. Four other volumes have received final editing by Dr. Greenfield and will soon go to the Government Printing Office. So, of the total of eighty-one volumes scheduled, fifty-four had been published or were awaiting publication when Dr. Greenfield vacated his office in Temporary Building "C" next to Fort McNair. The remaining volumes are in various stages of preparation and all of them will reflect to a considerable extent the policies, practices and principles associated with the retiring chief.

It was characteristic of Dr. Greenfield that he retired before reaching the prescribed age. "It's best to pull out while you're still going strong," he often remarked. "You don't realize when you begin to slip, and your friends are too kind to tell you. I'm going to turn the job over to someone else before any doubt arises." And so he did.

Kent Roberts Greenfield, affectionately known as "Bobs" by his close associates, was born in Chestertown, Maryland July 20, 1893. He received the Ph. D. degree from Johns Hopkins at twenty-one, and immediately launched a career of college teaching. After five years at the University of Delaware—with time out for service as a second lieutenant of infantry in 1918-1919—he became assistant professor of history at Yale University in 1920. After ten years at Yale he went to Johns Hopkins University where he was professor of European history and chairman of the History Department from 1930 until 1942.

In 1942 he was commissioned major and

appointed Chief of the Historical Section, Army Ground Forces. In this capacity he planned, directed and helped write the history of the organization and training of the American forces which Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair prepared for their overseas missions. Dr. Greenfield rose to the rank of colonel, and for outstanding achievement as Historical Officer of Army Ground Forces he was awarded the Legion of Merit.

As he was concluding his military service and making plans to return to Johns Hopkins he was offered the position of Chief Historian of the Army. This offer caused him considerable anguish. As a successful teacher, a highly respected scholar with two books to his credit (*Sumptuary Law in Nurnberg*; *Economics and Liberalism in the Risorgimento*) and the head of an illustrious department, he was strongly attached to the academic profession and his position at Johns Hopkins. On the other hand, the opportunity of directing a tremendous and unique historical program for the Army was a challenge that could not be ignored.

His greatest concern was whether the Army would provide the conditions that he deemed essential to the production of first-rate history. To settle this question he obtained an interview with the Army's Chief of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. In a conference which extended a half-hour beyond the ten minutes that had been scheduled, Dr. Greenfield was assured by the Chief of Staff that the Army was vitally interested in a full and objective history of its participation in World War II; that a team of trained historians and top-quality Army officers would be authorized for preparation of the history; that the historians would be given access to all the facts; and that, subject only to the requirements of national security, these historians would be allowed "to call the shots as they see them." The enthusiastic manner in which these

assurances were given and the strong interest and sympathetic understanding manifested by the Chief of Staff made up Dr. Greenfield's mind. He left the interview with a firm conviction that the Chief of Staff would sustain him in his determination to produce a history that would meet the highest standards of scholarship and merit the solid respect of the historical profession.

Subsequent developments were to prove the sincerity of General Eisenhower's statement. His interest in the history continued after he went to the White House, and his direct interposition in 1954 helped to rescue the historical program from a financial crisis.

Dr. Greenfield assumed his duties as Chief Historian of the Army in mid-April 1946. From the beginning he gave highest priority to personnel, for he was convinced that the history could be no better than the quality of people charged with its preparation. Through his wide acquaintance in academic circles and with the effective support of an Advisory Committee headed by James Phinney Baxter, 3d., President of Williams College, he was able to recruit a corps of superior historians (many of whom had obtained valuable experience as combat historians in World War II), editors, cartographers, records experts and other assistants. The Army provided an able group of officers to perform the military duties associated with the project.

Writing the history of the Army in World War II involved unique problems. No group of historians were ever confronted by as enormous a mass of records as were Dr. Greenfield and his associates. In his book, *The Historian and the Army*, published in 1954, Dr. Greenfield stated: "The Army alone produced 17,120 tons of records, enough to fill 211 miles of filing cases set end to end." Even so, the written records, owing largely to reliance of modern armies on the radio and telephone, had numerous gaps. To fill them in, historians resorted to

various expedients, including interview of survivors and submission of draft narratives to key participants for comment and criticism. To tell the important story of "what was happening on the other side of the hill" enemy records were assembled, translated and analyzed, and interviews were held with leading officers of the opposing forces.

The program headed by Dr. Greenfield called for the writing of contemporary history on a scale greatly exceeding that of any prior undertaking. It required a type of collaboration not previously attempted by the historical profession. To meet these special conditions and to assure production of a history that would meet the highest professional standards, Dr. Greenfield devised a remarkably fine system for training his staff and reviewing and refining their work. An important feature of this system was a modified version of the seminar which Dr. Greenfield and his colleagues had developed at Johns Hopkins. As applied to the Army history, a selected chapter was sent well in advance to persons who were to participate in the seminar; these included commanding generals and others who had first hand knowledge of the events treated, the chief historian, the author and a few of the author's colleagues. At the seminar sessions, which lasted about two hours, the narrative was exposed to the closest scrutiny, "the generals had their day in court," and valuable instruction was given in the writing of contemporary military history. Both the outside critics—who on one occasion included Generals Eisenhower and Thomas T. Handy—and the authors found the seminars to be a highly stimulating experience.

Another important feature of Dr. Greenfield's system was the review panel. This was a small group, carefully selected on the basis of their specialized knowledge, to which each manuscript was submitted for thorough criticism before the final processing. The review

panel consisted of the chief historian, civilian and military members of the staff, principal participants in the events described, and at least one distinguished historian from the outside. After study of the manuscript the members of the panel held a session, not attended by the author, in which they subjected the manuscript to a thoroughgoing criticism. The results of this discussion were the bases of a detailed critique which the Chief Historian wrote for the author to use as a basis for his final revision.

Seminars and panels were supplemented by numerous informal conferences of the author with his section chief (who himself was an author as well as "dean"), the chief historian, colleagues working in related fields and various outsiders who were in a position to give expert advice. Thus the office over which Dr. Greenfield presided was in effect a graduate school, and it possessed distinctive advantages which enabled it to give a type of specialized training—extending all the way from initial note to published book—that could not be matched by any educational institutional in the world.

The ultimate measure of an institution is its product. The histories produced in the Office of the Chief of Military History have achieved warm praise from the historical profession, the armed services and citizens at large. When the first volume of the *History of the U. S. Army in World War II* was published in 1947—the title of the volume was *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* and one of the authors was Kent Roberts Greenfield—Hanson Baldwin stated in a review in the *New York Times*: "Its objectivity is precise, its scholarship enormous, its details staggering." The second volume to be published, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, drew from a French reviewer the comment: "The study has a character of self-examination that deserves the attention not only of

Americans but also of foreign specialists in this field who could learn from lessons based on experience on a very large scale, reported with complete frankness." Subsequent volumes elicited equally high praise. A review published in the *Journal of Modern History* in 1952 acclaimed Hugh Cole's *Lorraine Campaign* as "carrying an almost unsailable air of authority," a volume "attractive to general readers and invaluable for military students." Louis Morton's *The Fall of the Philippines* published in 1952, was pronounced by one reviewer as "the best detailed account it seems possible to assemble" and another critic stated that it "captures the mud and courage of battle with tense honesty."

In a farewell statement to his staff, "Bobs" Greenfield expressed pride in the achievements of the organization which he was leaving. "Our efforts have won respect not only in the Army," he declared, "but also in the historical profession, which was at first inclined to believe that because we were employed by the Army, we would be unable to maintain our professional integrity . . . We have become the first competent faculty of military history this country has had and one that can be matched at present only in the British Commonwealth. . . . Publication of scholarly books in hard covers, with the name of the author on each . . . has paid off not only in books of enduring value but also in an ability to render short range services of information that reflect the knowledge and critical maturity of responsible experts. By this emphasis on broad and solid historical knowledge the Army has added another to its list of honorable distinctions." With characteristic modesty Greenfield added: "For these achievements I am obviously entitled to only a limited share of credit. No man in a position of professional responsibility has enjoyed the benefit of more disinterested and intelligent cooperation

from his associates . . . or of more loyal opposition when that was necessary."

The recipients of this warm tribute unquestionably deserved it. But Greenfield himself deserves much of the credit for procuring this able corps of specialists, building them into an effective team, holding them together in the face of recurring budget crises, obtaining supplementary allocations to keep the program going, and providing all the conditions essential for the production of a first-rate history. One of his closest associates during the past twelve years stated shortly after Greenfield's retirement: "His greatest contribution has been his insistence upon high standards of scholarship and literary effectiveness. . . . Only one who has watched him work closely can appreciate how much he has lifted the literary quality and effectiveness of the writers. His other strong points have included a devotion and application to duty (he has set the standards for hard work in this office), a refreshing optimism and a belief that he could get a job done whatever the obstacle, and a large degree of fairness and finesse in dealing with a group of professional prima donnas. . . . When the scholarship or application to duty of any of his staff has been in question, regardless of his personal attitudes or relationships, he has rendered a detached judgment with remarkable objectivity. With all he has commanded the high respect of his civilian and military associates."

Another long-time associate summed up Chief Historian Greenfield's role thus: "He's like a bass fiddle in a jazz combo: You may not always hear him, but if he stopped playing, you'd know it." This seems to be an apt appraisal of Dr. Greenfield's influence and contribution. Fortunately for the *History of the U. S. Army in World War II*, his continuing contact with the work, on an informal basis, affords a basis for hoping he will not "stop playing" for a long time.

FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN WORLD WAR II

BY WILLIAM EMERSON*

“CONSTITUTIONS,” the great Napoleon once remarked, “should be short and obscure.” In one, at least, of its provisions, the American Constitution, otherwise so precise and balanced, satisfies the Emperor’s prescription. The Commander-in-Chief clause provides that, among his other powers, “the President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several states when called into the actual service of the United States.”

The implications of this short phrase have perplexed succeeding generations more than they did the framers of the Constitution. The clause was little pondered or debated in the conventions. Some question, it is true, was raised whether the President should have power to command forces in the field without consent of the legislative; but a motion to that effect failed of passage. Otherwise, the Commander-in-Chief clause passed into the final draft without debate. Alexander Hamilton devoted to it only two short paragraphs in *The Federalist*, concluding that “the propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it.”¹ The President’s powers as

Commander-in-Chief were a constitutional afterthought, the military counterpart of his—as it seemed at the time—more ample executive powers. The President, as Lord Bryce observed, was considered merely “an enlarged copy of the state governor, or, to put the same thing differently, a reduced and improved copy of the English King,” and the military powers granted him were analogous to theirs and were based, similarly, on ancient tradition. No provision of the new Constitution provoked less controversy.²

Read in the afterglow of a hundred years’ experience, however, the Commander-in-Chief clause, and the unstipulated powers which go with it, raise as many constitutional questions as they settle. One of the more vague provisions of the Constitution, it is also unique in conferring *office*, not, as elsewhere in the Constitution, *functions*. Furthermore, as the framers neglected to set forth clearly the powers of that office, it was impossible in the nature of things to place restrictions upon the Commander-in-Chief’s powers save for such restrictions as were implicit in the Congress’s power of the purse. Hamilton appears to have reflected the contemporary opinion in describing those powers as “nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the confederacy,” that is, as powers of purely military character.³ Under modern conditions of war, how-

*Dr. Emerson of Calhoun College, Yale University, presented this significant study at the joint session of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association, 28 Dec. 1957.

¹Edward M. Earle, ed., *The Federalist* (New York, 1937), No. 74, p. 482.

²*Ibid.*, p. 448 and note.

³*Ibid.*, p. 448.

ever, these vague powers have implications broader than any foreseen by the framers of the Constitution and have been utilized, in effect, to set aside the Constitution itself under emergency. Even in the narrower sphere of military command, questions arise. What, in fact, does the clause add to the military powers enjoyed by the President in his capacity as head of the executive branch? How are his powers, and, more precisely, his actions, as Commander-in-Chief distinct from his powers and actions as President? And how do they affect his relations with his military subordinates?

Answers to these questions are by no means clear. Historically it has proved almost impossible to distinguish the acts of the Commander-in-Chief from those of the President, and neither Lincoln nor Franklin Roosevelt were able to keep clear the distinction between their two roles. From the point of view of the military historian, indeed, the significance of the Commander-in-Chief's office appears very largely to be negative, though none the less important for that. In war a very narrow line separates decisions of policy, the sphere of civilian leadership, from decisions of strategy, the sphere of military commanders; the massive pressures of modern total war, furthermore, and the growing professionalization of military command have well nigh obliterated that line. In war as in peace, the President will set the main outlines of policy and these will in the natural course of events be decisive of broad strategic issues. Despite this, however, the relationship of policy to strategy is a reciprocal one, for military requirements, as the military history of the twentieth century so clearly attests, impinge upon and often dislodge political purposes. Here is the problem and the paradox of civil-military relations. In the strategic sphere, in all that concerns the structure and deployment of military forces, political leadership must be respon-

sive to technical military opinion and advice, but it must, at whatever cost, shape and direct the military instrument to support and serve its own higher political purposes. "War", as Clausewitz put it, "has its own grammar but not its own logic."

Here lies the significance of the commander-in-chief clause. In the sphere of strategy, the vital middle ground between combat and political purpose, the American President, by provision of the Commander-in-Chief clause, is supreme. If his powers are undefined, it is clear at least that, as one authority has remarked, "no one can be put over him or be authorized to give him orders in the direction of the . . . forces."⁴ At the head of the American forces, the Constitution places an amateur strategist of high and unrivalled rank. As Commander-in-Chief, the President may select, discharge, hearken to or ignore his military advisers without check or even the necessity of explanation. He can, if he chooses, assert his will quite independently of *any* subordinate military agency, for, in his relations with the military, the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief is clear and unchallenged. In the narrowly military sphere, this authority cannot be said to augment the powers which the President wields as head of the executive branch. But, vast and vague, it may be said to guard them, to serve, indeed, as the shield and buckler of his presidential powers against the possibility of military—and, to a very large degree, any other—encroachments during time of crisis.⁵

I

To claim such powers is one thing, to wield them is another. Both constitutionally

⁴Edward S. Corwin, *The President; Office and Powers* (New York, 1948), p. 276.

⁵For a discussion of the Commander-in-Chief powers, see Corwin, *op. cit.*, Chapter VI; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957) Chapter IV; and Louis Smith, *American Democracy and Military Power* (Chicago, 1951), *passim*.

and administratively, the office of Commander-in-Chief is merely a title, and different presidents have interpreted and used the office in very different ways, depending upon their personalities and circumstances. Woodrow Wilson made little use of these powers during World War I, interceding as little as possible in the spheres of his Secretary of War, his Chief of Staff and—in the operational theatre—the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Force. He appears indeed to have given little attention to the military side of the war; in the words of one student of American military history, "He kept the war 'professional.'"⁶ On the other hand, Abraham Lincoln used his position as Commander-in-Chief vigorously if somewhat ineffectually. In the direction of war, the tools of command are often more influential than high rank or vague powers. As Lincoln's experience during the Civil War revealed, the office of Commander-in-Chief is an empty title unless buttressed by a machinery of military counsel and of military command capable of mediating the strategic directives of the Commander-in-Chief to the forces and, thus, of giving them concrete military meaning. Control of this machinery is vital and, in many areas of war, decisive; until the promotion of General Grant in 1864, Lincoln's authority was vitiated by the weakness of his general staff and the incoherence of the Federal command system.

No war President has construed these powers so broadly or wielded them so vigorously as did Franklin Roosevelt in World War II. In the growing world crisis of the late 1930's, he moved early to assert them. In July 1939, conscious of the approach of war and jealous as always of his authority, Roosevelt, invoking a rarely-used presidential power, issued a Military Order which trans-

ferred the Joint Army-Navy Board, the Joint Army-Navy Munitions Board and several other military procurement agencies from the service departments into the newly-established Executive Office of the President.⁷ Henceforth the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations who, with certain of their advisers, made up the Joint Board, were to work under the "direction and supervision" of the Commander-in-Chief, as they continued later to do in their war-time guise of Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the same time the Munitions Board and other procurement agencies were also placed under the direct control of the President, exercised in this instance through the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Louis Johnson. Just as the Joint Board became in 1939 the President's principal agents in the field of strategy, the Assistant Secretary of War, working through the Joint Munitions Board, became the President's deputy for home-front mobilization and, to a certain degree, independent of his own superior, the Secretary of War; the teeming war emergency agencies which later inherited and amplified the powers of the Joint Munitions Board were in their turn to enjoy the same close relationship with the President.⁸

The immediate results of this new arrangement were modest but significant. The principal war agencies in both the strategic and the production fields were clearly established as presidential, not departmental, agencies. At the same time the Joint Board, while preserving its old form and organization, altered its nature. Before 1939 it had functioned primarily as an inter-departmental consultative agency, advisory to the service secretaries and concerned in large part with adjudicat-

⁷Ray S. Cline, *The War Department: Washington Command Post: the Operations Division* (Washington, D. C., 1951), p. 45f.

⁸Eliot Janeway, *The Struggle for Survival: a Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World War II* (New Haven, 1951), p. 44ff.

⁶D. W. Brogan, "The United States: Civilian and Military Power," in Michael Howard, ed., *Soldiers and Governments* (London, 1957) p. 177.

ing disagreements over matters of joint interest to the War and Navy Departments. The Military Order of 1939 had the effect of raising the Joint Board above the departmental level; by placing the Chiefs in a special relationship to the President, it made them in some sort independent of their immediate superiors on the secretarial level. In their new circumstances, the Chiefs and their advisors extended the range and scope of their interests. Increasingly after 1939 the Joint Board, under the control of the President, concerned itself with questions of national, rather than service, strategy, and produced in their prewar studies some of the basic strategic plans which were later to influence our wartime role.⁹

By this little-noticed Military Order of 1939, Franklin Roosevelt laid the institutional foundations of his powers as Commander-in-Chief. The new arrangements were not a model of administrative symmetry. Like so many of Roosevelt's arrangements, they were, in Secretary Stimson's words, "inherently disorderly." In particular the service secretaries were placed in an anomalous position; they retained control over, and responsibility for, their departments but *not* their military chieftains who, with their advisers, operated directly beneath the President. If the service secretaries are indeed the principal agents of civilian control over the military, it would seem that in strategic matters the chiefs, as Admiral Leahy was to remark at the end of the war, were "under no civilian control whatever," apart, of course, from that exercised by the President himself.¹⁰ Both before and after our entry into war, the secretaries

were little consulted in strategic questions and during the war, they were never included on the regular distribution lists for the Joint Chiefs of Staff papers despite the fact that the Joint Chiefs continually dealt with questions for which the secretaries were legally responsible.¹¹ Similarly the new organization had the unfortunate effect of stultifying attempts at co-ordination *between* departments. Under the new dispensation, the labors of the Standing Liaison Committee of the War, Navy and State Departments, set up in 1938 at Secretary Hull's instance to co-ordinate foreign and military policies, lost much of their importance. As the pre-war crises deepened, the Joint Board, under Roosevelt's supervision, stepped up its planning activities and, in effect, shouldered aside the SLC; the latter agency did not altogether cease its efforts but, improvised and somewhat informal in character, they had little effect on events and policies.¹² Meanwhile basic military procurement and production planning, although placed under authority of the Assistant Secretary of War, was carried out—separately—within the departments. Both before and during the war, decisions in this sphere in effect were initiated within the departments, not by the Joint Chiefs as such, and were decided in the Executive Office of the President. In its origins, this arrangement appears to have been a Rooseveltian device to "get around" his isolationist Secretary of War, Mr. Harry Woodring. Its results were lasting for it had the effect, unforeseen in 1939 and perhaps never clearly appreciated during World War II, of divorcing production from strategy—or, at any rate, from joint strategy.¹³

⁹Mark S. Watson, *The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, D. C., 1950), pp. 79-84, 97-104.

¹⁰U. S. Congress, Senate, 79th Congress, First Session, *Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, Session on S. 84: a Bill to Provide for a Department of Armed Forces* (Washington, D. C., 1945) p. 521.

¹¹U. S. Congress, Senate, 79th Congress, First Session, *Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy on Unification of the War and Navy Departments* [The Eberstadt Report] (Washington, D. C., 1945) p. 75, 53.

¹²Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-94.

¹³*Senate Hearings on S. 84, 79th Congress, First Session, p. 521; Eberstadt Report, pp. 70-71, 76, 86-7.*

All this was somewhat ramshackle, though very characteristic of Roosevelt's administrative penchant. "Roosevelt's normal way of organizing a department," one authority has observed, "was to split it right down the middle."¹⁴ He permitted and encouraged, within his cabinet and within his administration generally, a duplication of effort, an overlapping of authorities and a development of personal antagonisms which amounted in some cases almost to civil wars. Whatever his motives, the effect was to increase, and at the same time often to disguise, his own authority. The Military Order of 1939 had, on the whole, that effect. As concerned foreign policy, strategy and military procurement, it left Roosevelt himself the sole co-ordinating link between the various subordinate agencies in these fields. Co-ordination as a consequence was not very effective.¹⁵ Despite these flaws, the new arrangements were not without merit. For one thing, they provided that personal relationship so congenial to Roosevelt's temperament and his administrative methods. They greatly magnified the power and independence of the military chiefs. Finally, and not least important, through its very dispersion of subordinate authority, the Military Order of 1939 gave the President powers of decision in the military field which were real and not merely apparent, for in many areas of military concern, he, the Commander-in-Chief, alone *could* decide. In this respect, the Military Order of 1939 set the pattern for American civil-military relations in World War II. Jealous of his powers and deeply sensitive to the swirling political

tides within Washington and the country, Roosevelt was ever unwilling to share his authority. He meant to exercise to the full his powers as Commander-in-Chief. In this respect, the new arrangements of the 1939 Military Order may be said merely to have confirmed the President's tendencies in military affairs.

From the very beginning of the American rearmament program, the President had shown that his independence and self-confidence were no less marked in strategic than in other matters. In November 1938 Roosevelt, alarmed by the implications of the Munich crisis, summoned his principal military advisers to a White House conference on rearmament. At this conference the President as usual did most of the talking. His objectives were broad and startling: production of 10,000 military aircraft by 1940, establishment of plant capacity for producing 10,000 planes annually—and nothing else! This "program" clashed with considered military opinion on rearmament. The impetus for it came from diplomatic considerations rather than from the military authorities themselves. Indeed the President's purpose, as nearly as it can be discerned, was primarily not to build up the Army Air Corps but to assist Great Britain and France. As General Henry H. Arnold later recalled, the President did not seem to want an American air force at all, feeling that new barracks in Wyoming "would not scare Hitler"; what he wanted was "airplanes—now—and lots of them."¹⁶ Whatever the President's aims, he was persistent. He brushed aside General Staff requests for a balanced military force, and ignored General Marshall's sharp warning that his plans were "contrary to the considered judgment" of his military advisers. The Presidential decision was accepted, under

¹⁴Janeway, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹⁵Field Marshal Sir John Dill commenting on the American war machinery in a letter to Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke in early 1942, was not impressed. "The whole organization," he wrote, "belongs to the days of George Washington who was made Commander-in-Chief of all the forces and just did it. Today the President is Commander-in-Chief of all the forces but it is not so easy to just do it." Arthur Bryant, ed., *The Turn of the Tide* (London, 1957). p. 293.

¹⁶Watson, *op. cit.*, Chapter V. See also Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago, 1955), VI, 8-10.

protest. General Marshall and the War Department staff sought from 1938 to moderate the effects of the President's desire to concentrate exclusively on aircraft production and in the end managed to win considerable concessions from the President. But if Roosevelt gave ground to his professional advisers, it must nevertheless be recorded that, from the start, his own view of rearmament needs prevailed over the more conservative advices from the military chiefs; the vital impulse had come from the President. As the official historian of the Chief of Staff's office has noted

. . . this Presidential proposal must be regarded as far transcending—in its importance as an impulse to actual acquisition of weapons—the recommendations of War Department officials, civilian and military, which antedated the November 1938 meeting. . . . The summaries of Army needs . . . were placed in the President's hands and ultimately they would prove useful. But they do not appear to have had any immediate result."¹⁷

These events of November 1938 set a long persisting pattern in the President's relations with the military. Like many of his interventions in military affairs, Roosevelt's interest in airplanes was somewhat off-hand in its presentation to his military advisers; General Marshall's biographer says that Marshall was deeply angered and felt the President was "acting irresponsibly" and had "surrendered to a momentary whim."¹⁸ In such matters—as was most notably the case in Roosevelt's casual announcement of the unconditional surrender formula at Casablanca—the President's manner often disguised his purposes. Rightly or wrongly, he was convinced that aircraft held the key to the diplomatic situation in Europe and the depth of his belief was shown by his willingness in 1939 and 1940 to buck isolationist

sentiment on this point almost alone. "Planes—now—and lots of them" remained his constant theme. He repeated it in his 1939 Budget Address and sought consistently in the last months of European peace and, later, during the period of "phony war," to make American aircraft production facilities available to England and France. The grave crisis of 1940 merely strengthened his conviction. On 16 May 1940 amid the Allied disasters in Flanders, Roosevelt in a characteristic gesture called for an annual aircraft production of 50,000, a figure which he had arrived at on his own calculation and—apparently—without consultation of, or advance notice to, the Secretary of War or responsible officers in the War Department.¹⁹ The new Presidential figure, like others in the past, was received with some scepticism in a War Department already overburdened with what one officer ruefully called "the mass production of programs."²⁰ And as was almost always the case, the military planners, working more closely with the details than Mr. Roosevelt was accustomed to do, succeeded to some extent in placing his extravagant proposals within a sounder military perspective, and, moreover, managed for the first time to win Presidential approval for limited increases in ground forces and further purchases of munitions and equipment. Some balance thus was achieved in the rearmament program. It should nevertheless be emphasized that in 1940, as in 1938, Roosevelt without consulting his military chieftains had once again taken the lead and had on his own account set production goals which,

¹⁹At the time that Roosevelt issued his demand for 50,000 airplanes, Air Corps planners had just completed staff studies of a proposal to increase first line combat aircraft strength from 1900 to 2700, this increase to be accomplished within the framework of the previously established 5500 plane program. 50,000 planes approximated the total American aircraft production since the Wright brothers took the air at Kittyhawk in 1903. See Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, VI, 264.

²⁰Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, VI, 271.

¹⁷Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 127, 131.

¹⁸Robert Payne, *The Marshall Story* (New York, 1951), pp. 111-112.

in their persisting over-emphasis on aircraft production, clashed strongly with responsible military opinion.

The President's policies and predilections in this sphere are open to serious criticism. Great efforts—and even greater publicity—were devoted to American rearmament. Looking back at the period in afterlight, it is doubtful if these efforts during the years 1938-1940 contributed in any considerable degree to our military strength; as one student of American war production has observed, "to hindsight, the story of the things left undone during the lost year of 1939-1940 is unbelievable."²¹ But, rightly or wrongly, military strength was not Roosevelt's sole—or even his major—aim at the time. From the beginning of the rearmament program, Roosevelt sought, not rearmament, but the appearance of rearmament. He was concerned with the "show-window," not the "stockroom." If this military policy were ambiguous, so, too, were the situations which the President faced in the pre-war period, for beneath American rearmament and the gradual veer of American policy away from the isolationism of the 1930's lay a major question which was never finally answered until the day of Pearl Harbor. Was American rearmament a *preparation for*, or an *alternative to*, war? Lesser figures on the crowded national scene had their own very various views in the matter. Roosevelt to the bitter end was never willing completely to abandon the latter alternative. It lay behind his decision to provide "all aid short of war" to Britain, China and Russia. It lay behind his orders to move the Pacific Fleet to the distant base at Pearl Harbor, a show of strength designed to deter Japanese aggression but strongly protested by the fleet commander Admiral Richardson. It lay, too, behind the President's insistence of high pro-

duction goals rather than balanced military forces. On the eve of Pearl Harbor the Army, under prodding by the President, was reluctantly planning to deactivate eighteen National Guard divisions in the interest of conserving material and manpower needed in the factories.²² Such a weakening of American ground strength at a time when the Far Eastern crisis moved towards disaster seems incredible in retrospect. But the lights of retrospect are clear and harsh. From the Munich crisis onwards, Roosevelt pursued a diplomacy of deterrence in which military appearances, including aid to allies, were no less important, in many respects were more important, than military realities.

It was a gamble which, in the end, brought grave military disasters. But, quite apart from the merits of these policies, the fact remains that the actions of the Commander-in-Chief were coherent with and properly subordinate to the major lines of American diplomacy. On the record of the prewar period, Roosevelt showed himself nothing loath to exercise his military powers independently of, and on occasion in flat disagreement with, his chiefs of staff. This point is the more worthy of emphasis because, in the latter stages of World War II, Roosevelt followed very closely the strategic counsels of his Joint Chiefs; Sir Winston Churchill, indeed, speaks of the President on one occasion as having been "oppressed by the prejudices of his military advisers."²³ This is an impression widely shared and Roosevelt himself contributed to that impression, unconsciously perhaps, on some occasions quite consciously. In a 1943 discussion with an itinerant British general, for instance, he remarked, "As you know I rely entirely on my constitutional technical advisers, particularly in military matters, which I gather is not the case in

²²Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 360-366.

²³Winston Churchill, *Closing the Ring* (Boston, 1951), p. 346.

²¹Janeway, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

some other countries."²⁴ This is not altogether borne out by the facts of prewar days. In many instances Roosevelt to be sure followed the advice of his chiefs. In many others, the military were able to mitigate or even vitiate strategic and production proposals of the President. But whenever the military advice of his chiefs clearly diverged from his own notions, Roosevelt did not hesitate to ignore or override them. He took his powers as Commander-in-Chief literally, and, on occasion, he used them high-handedly. In 1940, for example, an air force planner who presented detailed figures and charts to show that aid to Great Britain was undermining American air rearmament, the President cut him off with a breezy "Don't let me see that again!"²⁵ In the deepening crisis of 1940-1941 and the slow American drift towards war, the basic military decisions were largely based upon presidential rather than military opinions and the views of the Commander-in-Chief and his military advisers were increasingly divergent. In 1940 and afterwards the planners of the Joint Board, as their RAINBOW war plans crystallized and their strategic views grew clearer, consistently advised that our principal efforts be concentrated on building up powerful *American* defense forces designed to protect our interests in the western hemisphere and urged that elsewhere, particularly in the Far East, we seek to gain time through diplomacy. At each crucial stage on the road to war, they put forward plans and memoranda embodying this advice. At each stage, the President, while agreeing in principle with these strategies, neglected to follow them. It was a con-

stantly repeated pattern. In June 1940 Roosevelt overrode the advice of the Joint Board and decided to extend full military assistance to Great Britain.²⁶ Committed to this course against their initial judgment, the military chiefs in the following months had perforce to accept the fact that American rearmament would be considerably slowed down by the weight of British needs and sought therefore to limit our commitments elsewhere, namely in the Pacific areas. The Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Richardson, came to Washington in autumn 1940 to plead that the fleet be moved back to San Diego from Pearl Harbor, where the Commander-in-Chief had stationed it on his own motion.²⁷ At about the same time, the Army War Plans Division, surveying the deteriorating situation in the Far East, warned that a crisis there would find that "we are not now prepared and will not be prepared for several years to come."²⁸ The Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, concurred and from these considerations emerged a firm and carefully argued Navy Department proposal to concentrate our forces in the Atlantic, the famous Plan

²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 111-113. In their Joint Estimate of 22 June 1940 the chiefs said that "to release to Great Britain additional war material now in the hands of the armed forces will seriously weaken our present state of defense and will not materially assist the British forces." They recommended that no further commitments be made. The President's reaction was typical. He said, "In general, yes," but in further remarks he qualified his agreement so extensively that in the final draft the relevant recommendation was "non-belligerent support of the British Commonwealth and China." See also Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *The War Department: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942* (Washington, D. C., 1953), pp. 13-21.

²⁷See U. S. Congress, 79th Congress, First Session, *Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings . . .* (Washington, D. C., 1946), Part, I, pp. 270-282, 305-306. Admiral Richardson apparently made his point. When he was later summarily relieved, Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, told Richardson that he had "hurt the President's feelings:" *ibid.*, pp. 323-324.

²⁸Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-118.

²⁴Frederick Morgan, *Overture to Overlord* (London, 1950), pp. 207-208. General Morgan was suitably impressed by this remark and went away strengthened, no doubt, in his opposition to Churchillian projects of strategy. The historian, alas! must record the fact the general had been ushered into Roosevelt's office by none other than Harry Hopkins!

²⁵Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

DOG memorandum of 12 November 1940.²⁹ Plan DOG in turn became one of the bases of a joint Army-Navy proposal of late 1940, based upon the RAINBOW 5 war plan, for "a rapid increase of Army and Navy strength and abstention from steps which would provoke attack by any other powers." These advices were put forward as the formal American strategic position in the forthcoming ABC conference in Washington with British military authorities, and were urged as such upon the President. Warning his chiefs against what he termed "a state of mind involving plans which could [only] be carried out after the lapse of some months," Roosevelt neither approved nor disapproved the Joint Board's proposals.³⁰ But they appear to have had little effect on his actions in subsequent months. Over protests, he insisted that American aircraft production be shared 50-50 with the British, retarding thereby the build-up of American air strength. American convoys in the Western Atlantic led to demands for Army garrisons which seriously overstrained the Army's limited capabilities. In May 1941, Lend-Lease aid was extended to China. In July 1941, in a climactic act, the President imposed an oil embargo on Japan and, on the same day, nominated General MacArthur to command all army forces in the Far East and called the Philippine Army into American service. The last two decisions were turning-points. The embargo on oil threatened the life of the Japanese nation. MacArthur's appointment presaged a reversal of previous War Department policy of no reinforcement for the Philippines which were thought to be indefensible in any event. From August onwards, Pacific strategy was revised, the Philippines given high priority and troops and supplies in increasing tides flowed into

that distant outpost to build up a powerful deterrent force against the Japanese. In neither of these grave decisions were the strategic views of the Joint Board heeded. They had advised strongly against the embargo and, although the circumstances remain somewhat obscure, the President himself appears to have decided on the appointment of General MacArthur without consulting the War Department's views and, indeed, with little advance notice to it.³¹

Like so many of the basic decisions in the prewar period, these all were presidential decisions, taken of Roosevelt's own motion and on advice which sometimes contravened and often passed over the counsels of his military chiefs. Their effects were powerful. By late 1941, events in the Pacific and elsewhere had brought about the very situation which Roosevelt's military advisers had sought within the limits of their power and persuasion to avoid: a diplomatic crisis which portended war on two fronts and a serious dispersion of American military forces. Conscious of our weaknesses—a Navy only partly ready for war and an Army which, as one observer put it, was "to a large extent closed for alterations"—the Joint Board at each stage had opposed undertaking new commitments. At each stage, Roosevelt, influenced by other and perhaps weightier considerations, had accepted other counsels. To the very end of 1941, the Joint Board systematically opposed any steps which might provoke Japan. "War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up the defensive forces in the Far East," a Joint Board estimate warned on 5 November 1941, "[and] no ultimatum should be delivered to

³¹For the Joint Board's opposition to the oil embargo, see *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part V, pp. 2381-2384. For the incidents and effects of General MacArthur's appointment, see Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 397, 424-425, 434-439, 494-6 and Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.* pp. 63-67. Cf. Louis Morton, *The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines* (Washington, D. C., 1953), pp. 14-18.

²⁹See Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-28.

³⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 28-31; Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-125.

Japan."³² Roosevelt accepted this estimate but events nevertheless moved along the course previously set. It is perhaps significant of the Joint Board's influence during the grave crisis before Pearl Harbor that the decision to present Secretary Hull's Ten-Point Program—in effect if not in form an ultimatum to the Japs—was made without formal consultation of either the military chieftains or the civilian service secretaries.³³ In the hurrying crisis, the Joint Board's counsels and warnings were very largely ignored. These counsels and warnings are the more impressive in retrospect because they were so fully borne out by the event. American moves in the Pacific, as the chiefs had warned, precipitated rather than deterred Japanese attack. And as the chiefs had feared, war on two broad fronts came suddenly and disastrously upon an America only partially prepared and everywhere overextended militarily.

In pondering the relations between Commander-in-Chief and military staff during the period before Pearl Harbor, the historian must distinguish cause from effect. These relations were the result of many factors. For one thing, military advice may influence policy but it can never usurp its role. The Joint Board's advice, sound in itself, was nevertheless merely part of a larger picture, as the chiefs would have been the first to admit. This would have been the case even with a President less impulsive and less sure of himself in his management of foreign relations. Even more important was Mr. Roosevelt's almost complete lack of system in coordinating military and foreign affairs. As Secretary Stimson recorded in his diary in 1940, "I doubt whether we shall ever be able to hold him to any very systematic relations because

that is rather entirely antipathetic to his nature."³⁴ Again in 1941, Stimson complained, "He has no system. He goes haphazard and scatters responsibility among a lot of uncoordinated men and consequently things are never done."³⁵ At about the same time, General Marshall voiced the same feelings in a conference with his staff.

We are frittering away material without tangible results, . . . the influence and accomplishments of the State Department have been unfortunate . . . and the President must be protected against the importunities of those who are not fully aware of the seriousness of the present situation. . . . We must . . . begin the education of the President as to the true strategic situation—this coming after a period of being influenced by the State Department.³⁶

The effort, as we have seen, was unavailing and, in many respects, the prevailing lack of system was decisive.³⁷ But if the factors influencing Roosevelt's relations with the military were various, the effect was unmistakable. The deliberations and estimates of the military planners were not entirely without influence and they undoubtedly shaped the *details* of American military policy during the pre-war period. But they had only small effect on the basic grand strategic decisions of that period. In almost all cases, Mr.

³⁴Quoted in Wililam L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940* (New York, 1952), p. 770.

³⁵Langer and Gleason, *Undeclared War*, p. 561.

³⁶Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

³⁷It is interesting to note that in this connection Franklin Roosevelt the President differed with Franklin Roosevelt the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. As a consequence of his experiences in the Wilson war administration, the young Roosevelt in 1919 drafted a paper calling for a joint national planning agency, composed of representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments, to define American politico-military objectives and to study American capabilities. This memorandum, sent by Roosevelt to the State Department, was mis-directed to the Division of Latin American Affairs where, unread, it was permitted to gather dust in the files. See Ernest R. May, "The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States," in *Political Science Quarterly*, LXX (1955), 167-172.

³²*Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part I, 401-402; Part V, 2122-2123.

³³William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941* (New York, 1953), pp. 898-900.

Roosevelt made those decisions on his own initiative as President and Commander-in-Chief and in many instances, as we have seen, he made those decisions without consulting the chiefs. It is important to be clear on this point, for it forms part of the necessary background for understanding Roosevelt's war-time relations with his staff. During the prewar period, the main outlines of American policy and strategy were set by the Commander-in-Chief, assured of his own powers, confident of his judgment, and, in certain large matters, oblivious to the advices of his military chieftains. As the official historian of the office of the Army Chief of Staff has observed in a survey of the prewar period, . . . Roosevelt was the real and not merely nominal Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Every President has possessed the constitutional authority which that title indicates, but few Presidents have shared Mr. Roosevelt's readiness to exercise it in fact and in detail and with such determination. . . . Nobody, reading the record, can doubt that the determining influence in the making of military policy in these prewar days was that of the President as Commander-in-Chief . . . as is the constitutional design . . . right or wrong, with professional approval or without it, the decisions *were* made at the Presidential level and . . . in these and other instances the dutiful behavior of the Chief of Staff was determined by his civilian superior as precisely as orders from the Chief of Staff in their turn determined the dutiful behavior of his subordinates.³⁸

II

War brought changes in the relationships of Commander-in-Chief and the military services. In late 1941 and early 1942 amid wide disasters, the problems of the prewar period, wherein political and diplomatic advices weighed more heavily than military advice, gave way to the harsher problems of battle-front and coalition. Strategic initiative passed into enemy hands and the vast Jap

amphibious conquests in the Pacific theatres in early 1942 overthrew the very basis of prewar American and allied strategy. In this gloomy scene the key figures on the American side were theatre commanders like MacArthur, Nimitz and Stilwell, presiding with wide discretionary powers over operational commands and dealing as best they might with the enemy thrusts. While subordinate, they were nevertheless powerful influences in molding strategy in the early days of defeat as later in the years of victory. Above them there grew up a rudimentary military high command. In Washington, the War and Navy Departments were drastically reorganized in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. By early 1942 they had in effect become command posts from which the chiefs, General Marshall and Admiral King, directed—or in those early defeats, reacted to—the ebb and flow of a world-wide battle.³⁹ At the same time, the requirement of cooperation with the British brought about the transformation of the old Joint Army-Navy Board into the new Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Arnold the Army Air Force commander being raised to membership so that the American staff might fit the British model. And from this early strategic collaboration grew the Combined Chiefs of Staff which from the time of the ARCADIA conference in Washington in December 1941 functioned as the supreme allied military authority.

³⁸See Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 90-95; Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: a Naval Record* (New York, 1952), pp. 352-355; and Duncan S. Ballantine, *U. S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War* (Princeton, 1949), pp. 46-51. Admiral King held conjointly appointments as Chief of Naval Operations and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet—the latter title, as Whitehill notes, “abbreviated to COMINCH rather than the traditional CINCUS, which after 7 December, appeared to have undesirable connotations.” *King, a Naval Record*, p. 352. General Marshall held appointment as Chief of Staff of the United States Army although he was in effect Commanding General without having that title: Cline, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

³⁹Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7.

War, then, brought a great elaboration of American military structure and these organizational changes in their turn subtly altered the existing relationships between the President and his military chieftains. In 1942, and afterwards in increasing measure, Mr. Roosevelt dealt with men who were his personal military advisers, as before the war, but who at the same time were acting in effect as supreme commanders of their services in a global war. Beneath them, in a War Department and a Navy Department which increasingly took on the character of operational military staffs, lay another level of military authority—the planning staffs. They had great importance. At the planners' level the far-ranging details of global war were sifted and ordered amid masses of paper work; here the directives of higher authority were given precise and substantive military meaning. In theory the planners served as advisers to their chiefs, performing the vital but subordinate duties of staff officers. Actually the staffs, working more closely than their chiefs with the details of war, not seldom took the initiative and produced basic strategic conceptions such as the BOLERO plan of 1942. As in all organizations, pressures flowed in both directions, up as well as down. And although it would be easy to exaggerate the staffs' influence on the larger war decisions, it must be remarked that the military chiefs to a great extent saw the war through the eyes of their planners. The staffs' role, then, was as much an active as a passive one and their familiarity with the multifarious facts from which the larger patterns of strategy emerge made their work often conclusive of small issues and always influential over large issues.⁴⁰

⁴⁰The definitive study of the U. S. Army staff during World War II is Ray Cline's *Washington Command Post*, a detailed analysis of the workings of the Operations Division of the War Department. No similar study of the Navy planners has been completed.

With the coming of war, the Commander-in-Chief found himself at the apex of a vast machinery of military command. In theory this machinery was under his control and supervision as Commander-in-Chief. In fact the immensity of the war panorama as well as the burden of Mr. Roosevelt's other concerns as President meant that his control of the machinery could be only partial and somewhat indirect in its working. The relative independence of the theatre commanders; the central position and influence of the planning staffs; the wide powers and public respect enjoyed by his chiefs of staff—all these factors placed real limits on the Commander-in-Chief's independence of action which had not existed during the prewar period. His role had become highly institutionalized. In some spheres, it is true, Roosevelt's role remained a personal and intimate one; this was the case in his relations with the British Prime Minister, for instance, and with his top military advisers. In other and broader spheres, however, the authority of the Commander-in-Chief was mediated through a machinery of command vast and impersonal in its workings, a machinery which was not easily subjected to the influence of a single individual and one which, in many instances, tended to run on its own momentum. Throughout World War II, the Joint Chiefs and their planners enjoyed a considerable autonomy, far greater than the energetic British Prime Minister permitted his military commanders. In the sphere of war production, for example, the overall requirements after the outbreak of war were established by the separate services with little apparent control or interference by the Commander-in-Chief (in contrast to his prewar inclinations!) or even by the Joint Chiefs in their collective capacity. There was indeed very little attempt in World War II to coordinate pro-

duction and strategy from the top.⁴¹ Similarly, Roosevelt did little to affect American strategy in the Pacific theatres of war, although his concern for the postwar politics of that area was stronger by far than his interest in postwar Europe. He intervened, it is true, in the controversies over command and strategy in the China theatre and he overrode the Joint Chiefs' recommendation for an offensive in Burma and the Bay of Bengal in 1943. But, deep though his interest was in the naval war in the Pacific, Roosevelt exercised little if any direct influence on the development of strategy in that theatre. After the defensive victories of 1942, Pacific strategy emerged as a result of successive accommodations between the views of General MacArthur and the Army staff and those of Admiral Nimitz and the Navy Staff, without interventions from above, and Roosevelt's principal concern in the Pacific theatre was to limit the demands which it made upon the European theatres of war, not to direct its course. Unlike Mr. Churchill, finally, Roosevelt never meddled in operational planning or in the duties of theatre commanders. No less than Churchill, the President was intrigued by the events of war and gave close attention to daily reports from the fighting fronts. He had furthermore a considerable though amateur flair for strategy.⁴² With some few exceptions, however, he was content to work through the established military channels and to leave the details to others. Over a very wide range of military issues the Joint Chiefs and their staffs, free from Presidential interference, settled the daily business of war and were dominant in their own spheres.

But if war altered and somewhat lessened the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, it did not overthrow it nor did it diminish Roosevelt's willingness to exercise that authority. It is true that in the later stages of the war, after the first Quebec conference and after the Cairo-Teheran conferences, Roosevelt, while retaining to a certain extent his role as mediator between British and American strategic views, concurred generally with the military counsels of his chiefs and supported them with considerable tenacity against the strategic arguments of the British chiefs and their eloquent Prime Minister. After mid-1943, Anglo-American strategy increasingly took on the massive character which had been so long urged by the American chiefs and particularly by General Marshall and the Army staff, and with the Normandy invasion, the war effort in Europe moved inexorably toward the goal of total victory over Germany, much as had been urged by American Army planners from the time of the Victory Plan of 1941.

During this period American strategy, as one student has remarked, "emerged from the White House much as it had emerged from the Pentagon."⁴³ The Commander-in-Chief's role in this appears, and to a very large extent was, a passive one. It is indeed from this closing period of the war that comes the presently prevailing image of Mr. Roosevelt's term as Commander-in-Chief. The picture is that of a Commander-in-Chief concerned only to win the war as quickly and as completely as possible, attentive to and largely reliant upon the strategic advices of his military men and reluctant to disagree with them on technical matters. For instance, Robert Sherwood in his authoritative *Roosevelt and Hopkins* has argued that Roosevelt overruled the opinions of his chiefs on only

⁴¹See *Eberstadt Report*, pp. 70-71, 76, 80, 86-87.

⁴²Roosevelt's Washington's Birthday speech in 1942 and his Navy Day address in Philadelphia during the 1944 election campaign are concise and lucid analyses of American strategy during World War II. See *The War Messages of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (Washington, D. C., 1945), pp. 30-35, 146-149.

⁴³John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy, October 1944-August 1945* (London, 1956), VI, 344.

two occasions during the entire war—in July 1942 on the North African invasion and in December 1943 on the question of a projected operation in Burma and the Bay of Bengal.⁴⁴ Accepting this, Professor Huntington in his study of the American high command in World War II has concluded:

Too much harmony is just as much a symptom of bad organization as too much conflict. On the face of it, something is wrong with a system in which, during the course of a four-year major war, the political Chief Executive only twice overrules his professional military advisers. This can only mean that one of them was neglecting his proper function and duplicating the work of the other.⁴⁵

This is in many ways a misleading picture. Roosevelt's relations with his wartime chiefs, it is true, never took on the dramatic and forensic tones of Mr. Churchill's relations with his chiefs. Beneath the surface, however, there were serious stresses and strains on the relations of Commander-in-Chief and the military, stresses and strains which the unanimity of opinion during the closing phases of the war has somewhat obscured. In the earlier stages of the war, throughout 1942 and midway into 1943, Roosevelt's role and actions as Commander-in-Chief were much closer to the pattern of his actions in the prewar days than to those of 1944 and 1945. Until the first Quebec conference, it is no exaggeration to say that the prewar pattern prevailed, that the basic decisions which molded strategy were made by the Commander-in-Chief himself, against the advice of his own chiefs and in concert with Churchill and the British chiefs. There were various reasons for this. The American chiefs could not always agree on priorities during the beginning phases of the war; King with his eyes on the needs of the Pacific naval war, Arnold with his attention focused on the

requirements of the air battle, and Marshall, ever sensitive to the demands for great land forces in Europe, found it difficult to present an agreed case to the President. Moreover, British and American strategic views diverged widely in 1942 and early 1943, the American staff from the beginning arguing for a cross-channel invasion and the British emphasizing the need for operations in the Mediterranean theatre. Most important of all, the enemy everywhere held the strategic initiative during the early period of the war. In the Pacific theatres, in the Indian Ocean, in Russia and in the Mediterranean, strategic decision was made the more difficult for Allied war planners by virtue of the hard fact that they had for the most part to respond to enemy initiatives rather than to plan their own.

In these circumstances, Mr. Roosevelt in 1942 found it impossible to back his Joint Chiefs. And in the absence of agreement among the chiefs, he became subject, in Mr. Matloff's words, to "the gravitational pull" of other arguments, notably those of Churchill and the British Chiefs.⁴⁶ At no time during the course of the American war effort did political direction and military advice drift so far apart as during 1942. The result was a display of Presidential independence in military affairs which repeated, under war conditions, the story of the prewar period. The events surrounding the Allied decision to invade North Africa are perhaps the most revealing in this connection. The background of this story is well-known.⁴⁷ War Department planners, worried over the demands of the Pacific War and the dispersion of American forces over the world, pushed hard for agreement with the British on a cross-channel invasion in 1943—the BOLERO concept. In spring 1942 the British authorities tentatively

⁴⁴Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York, 1948), p. 446, 615, 948.

⁴⁵Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

⁴⁶Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

⁴⁷For an analysis of the origins and evolution of the BOLERO plan, see Cline, *op. cit.*, Chapter IX.

accepted the "Marshall Plan," as they called BOLERO, but not without grave reservations. This agreement, never wholehearted, was overthrown by the events of the summer of 1942—the Jap thrusts in the Indian Ocean and the Solomons, Rommel's defeat of the British Eighth Army and his *coup de main* at Tobruk, the shakiness of the Churchill government before a rising English public and political opinion, and, not least important, the slowness of American war production and preparations to hit their stride.⁴⁸ Through all of this, the American chiefs stuck grimly to their views and even contemplated switching American forces to the Pacific in event of continued British disagreement.⁴⁹ In a scene of crisis and of rising Anglo-American acrimony, Mr. Roosevelt in July 1942 intervened, powerfully and even ruthlessly, to assert his powers as Commander-in-Chief. He ruled out any diversion of forces to the Pacific, saying that it was like "taking up your dishes and going away" and he ordered Marshall and Hopkins to London to seek an agreed strategy with the British. Moreover he revised, beyond recognition, the original War Department draft instructions to the Hopkins-Marshall mission and the final draft in effect closed the issue in favor of the British strategic conceptions, and, as Mr. Herbert Feis has observed, in an "im-

perative tone such as he seldom employed."⁵⁰ Not least revealing he signed these instructions, "Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commander-in-Chief." Finally, on the same day the Combined Chiefs reached "conditional decision" on TORCH in London, Roosevelt in Washington informed his aides that he was making the decision *unconditional* and this decision he reinforced in September 1942 in the face of some War Department shuffling.⁵¹

The crisis in the American high command over TORCH was significant in several respects. Politics is a vital part of strategy and Roosevelt, as his position required, was of course far more sensitive to the political aspects of the TORCH decision than his chiefs were or should have been. In 1942 the political aspect was vital and it proved decisive in Roosevelt's judgment. The chiefs had for some time been aware that a North African invasion had attractions for Mr. Roosevelt; it was, in Secretary Stimson's words, his "great secret baby." This important fact however was apparently given little weight in their deliberations.⁵² And that failure undermined their case. Looking back on the TORCH decision in afteryears, General Marshall has recalled that he learned a great lesson from it: "in wartime the politicians have to do *something* important every year."⁵³ TORCH held together the Anglo-American

⁴⁸Robert Sherwood argues that Roosevelt's concern over Churchill's "powers of emotional endurance . . . after six months of mortification" was a weighty element in his later decisions on the issue of TORCH: *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 601-602. On the weakness of the Churchill government see the war narrative of one of Churchill's military staff: John Kennedy, *The Business of War* (London, 1957), pp. 194-195.

⁴⁹The implied threat of a transfer of American forces to the Pacific theatre had been present in the BOLERO plan from its inception. As General Esienhower, then Chief of the Operations Division, minuted General Marshall in March 1942, ". . . unless this plan is adopted as the eventual aim of all our efforts, we must turn our backs upon the Eastern Atlantic and go full out, as quickly as possible, against Japan!" Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, p. 182. This was a theme which grew in volume as the months wore on without producing final agreement with the British staff.

⁵⁰Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (London, n.d.), p. 220; Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin* (Princeton, 1957), p. 55. The full draft of the President's final instructions to the Hopkins-Marshall mission is printed in Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 603-606. Cf. the War Department's draft instructions, which Roosevelt edited and altered, in Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, Appendix B, pp. 384-385.

⁵¹Roosevelt took these steps on the advice of Hopkins: Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 611. See Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-284.

⁵²Cf. the President's outline instructions of 15 July to General Marshall and the somewhat divergent draft instructions drawn up in the War Department: *ibid.*, p. 273.

⁵³Samuel E. Morison, *Strategy and Compromise* (Boston, 1958), p. 38.

coalition during this difficult period of "bringing defeat underfoot" and this fact far outweighed in importance the operational and logistical considerations on which the War Department's plans had so largely rested. In recognizing and acting upon this fact, the Commander-in-Chief fulfilled his constitutional responsibilities. Beyond this, though, is the strategic significance of the TORCH decision. In war as in logic, the greater the less includes. The fundamental American strategic concept—to concentrate first against Germany—was sound and was so proved by the issue of the war. What the controversy over TORCH reveals is the forceful intervention of the Commander-in-Chief to preserve that basic strategy at a time when his Joint Chiefs, indignant over what they considered British inconstancy, seemed ready to abandon it and to redeploy their forces against Japan. It is of course impossible to say whether such a redeployment would have been possible under the conditions of 1942 and, if it had been possible, what its distant consequences might have been. But if the considerations which had led us to seek concentration first against Germany were sound in January 1942, they were sounder still in July 1942—the summer of Dieppe, of Tobruk and Alamein and of Stalingrad. It may well be thought that in intervening to save the Germany-first concept in 1942, Roosevelt showed a sounder strategic judgment than did his chiefs, for by his intervention he kept the war on the rails that *they* had set it on and those rails were sound ones.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Secretary Stimson and General Marshall never ceased to mourn the passing of BOLERO and the mounting of TORCH in 1942. On reflection, some of the OPD officers most closely associated with the development of the BOLERO plan, as their historian reveals, "were not so sure that it represented the wisest strategic course that could have been charted. Rather . . . they strongly felt the need of *some* central strategy and the BOLERO plan was their solution at the time:" Cline, *op. cit.*, 145n. 3. Field Marshal Brooke's rejoinder to

At about the same time as these disputes over TORCH Admiral William Leahy appeared upon the White House scene. Conscious, perhaps, before the event of the approaching crisis in his relations with Marshall and King, Roosevelt, on the recommendation of Marshall himself, had in July 1942 nominated Leahy his personal Chief of Staff. It was an appointment for which no precedent existed and for the remainder of the war Leahy's powers were never precisely set down in a chit or charter; in a press conference shortly after Leahy's appointment, Roosevelt contented himself with describing him as "a sort of leg man."⁵⁵ Despite the ambiguity of his position, Leahy functioned thereafter as liaison officer between the President and the Joint Chiefs, a task the performance of which was facilitated by his service seniority and by an old and warm friendship with Roosevelt dating back to World War I days. The resulting liaison between the President and the Pentagon was not perfect and never approached the high standards of the elaborate British war cabinet machinery; until the end of the war the American chiefs often learned of Presidential decisions only by way of the British secretariat in London and the British Joint Staff Mission resident in Washington.⁵⁶ But as a consequence of Leahy's position and personality, never again were the views of the White House and the Pentagon permitted to drift as far apart as they had done in the summer of 1942. Roosevelt, it is true, met with his chiefs only at intervals—General Marshall once told the harassed and envious Alan Brooke that he often did

General Marshall's continued plea for an early cross-channel invasion, because it would "finish the war quicker," was to the point. "Yes, probably," Brooke replied, "but not the way we hope to finish it!" Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, p. 620.

⁵⁵William D Leahy, *I Was There* (New York, 1950), pp. 97.

⁵⁶Cline, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-317.

not see the President for a month or six weeks—but Admiral Leahy saw him daily and, as Leahy has recorded, passed on to the chiefs “the basic thinking of the President on all war plans and strategy . . . [and] in turn brought back from the Joint Chiefs a consensus of their thinking.”⁵⁷ His role is difficult to document but it was an important one.⁵⁸

The events surrounding TORCH, then, and the appointment of Leahy disclosed once and for all the limits on the very real wartime autonomy enjoyed by the Joint Chiefs and their military staffs. Roosevelt, unlike Churchill, was not inclined to meddle with his military men or to dispute matters with them. Indeed, in his relations with them as in his relations with his political associates, Roosevelt loathed and shunned controversy as systematically as the great Englishman sought it. But as the intervention in TORCH planning had shown, Roosevelt was a Commander-in-Chief who held views of his own and no more in wartime than during the earlier period did he feel bound in any case to accept and rely solely on the technical advice of his chiefs. Churchill, Hopkins and Leahy, perhaps, had as much influence as they, and the President’s mind moreover roamed the world scene as actively, and perhaps as eccentrically, as did Mr. Churchill’s, discerning strategic alternatives not revealed, mercifully in many cases, to the sharper professional gaze of his advisers. The chiefs, on their part, appear to have drawn their own conclusions from these events, for TORCH was a demonstration of the Commander-in-Chief’s powers which was not repeated during the war. Henceforth disagreements between Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs were rare, the one indisputable instance being over

the ANAKIM operations at the Cairo conference.⁵⁹ But this “harmony” is susceptible of more than one interpretation. Despite his intervention in the TORCH planning, Roosevelt, in his relations with his military advisers as in political life, preferred the role of mediator to that of protagonist. And he knew moreover how to decide issues by ignoring them, understanding that in war even more than in peacetime politics, indecision decides by default. The result was a war leadership indirect in its methods and most difficult to document but one to which the Joint Chiefs had perforce to accommodate themselves. The ideas and projects of his great colleague Churchill were loudly and eloquently advanced, vigorously pushed, exhaustively documented. Roosevelt’s motives and intentions during the war, except on rare occasions, were difficult for his chiefs to penetrate; he seldom discussed these matters with them, seeming to prefer that they attempt to read his mind, accepting or rejecting the results of this process for reasons which he never made altogether clear to them. As an old political associate of the President’s—the Bronx leader Edward Flynn—observed, “Roosevelt would adopt ideas only if he agreed with them. If he disagreed, he simply did nothing.”⁶⁰ TORCH was the one great exception to this rule during World War II.

III

TORCH, then, exhibited once again and even improved upon the established prewar pattern of President Roosevelt’s relations with his chiefs. From the earliest time—from Plan DOG at least—the Joint Chiefs had time and again attempted to persuade Roose-

⁵⁹Admiral King felt that the cancellation of ANAKIM was “the one instance during the war in which . . . the President had gone against the advice of his Joint Chiefs”: Whitehill, *King: a Naval Record*, pp. 525-526.

⁶⁰Edward Flynn, *You’re the Boss* (New York, 1949), pp. 213-214.

⁵⁷Leahy, *op. cit.*, p. 98-99, 101.

⁵⁸A good appreciation of Leahy’s influence is to be found in John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, VI, 340-341.

vult to commit himself to a strategic rationale in the developing crisis. Their efforts were unsuccessful. He had, it would appear, accepted and made his own their basic idea of concentration in Europe, as the planners found to their discomfiture in July 1942. But in other, repeated efforts they had failed. Roosevelt, politician that he was, always declined to commit himself too far in advance of the event; hypotheses and "iffy questions" had little appeal to him. Thus Plan DOG, the ABC-1 memoranda, the Army's "Victory Program" of 1941 and finally the BOLERO plan were considered, neither accepted nor rejected, ultimately ignored. It is impossible to say whether Roosevelt either deeply understood these plans or agreed with the strategic analysis on which they were based. His own strategic judgment was in many ways quick but it was rarely explicit. It is however clear that he was unwilling, under the circumstances obtaining in the early stages of the war, to support the plans of his chiefs against the British. During this period the American and British chiefs debated strategy; the President and the Prime Minister decided it.

In 1943 Roosevelt, for so long independent of his chiefs in the strategic sphere, turned at last to support their conceptions against those of the British. The change was not immediate. Allied involvement in extended Mediterranean operations after the launching of TORCH deranged the War Department's plans for an early and decisive concentration of forces for attack on northwestern Europe and in late 1942 the BOLERO concept was swamped by clamorous demands on Allied resources for the Pacific, for anti-submarine warfare and for an air offensive in Europe. In these circumstances, the Joint Chiefs and their planners were unable to reach satisfactory agreement among themselves on strategic priorities. After their preparatory dis-

cussions for the Casablanca conference General Marshall had to report to the President that there were considerable differences of strategic opinion among the planners and some differences between the chiefs although they tended to regard a cross-channel invasion as more suitable for 1943 than an extension of operations in the Mediterranean. Roosevelt warned that "at the conference the British will have a plan and stick to it." Despite this warning, the Joint Chiefs were unable to concert their views, and there was as a result no American "position" at Casablanca.⁶¹ At no time during the war was the need for unanimity among the Joint Chiefs more dramatically illustrated. His pre-conference suggestion that the Joint Chiefs seek a compromise position between the BOLERO concept and British Mediterranean projects having been ignored, Roosevelt did not feel bound to support the chiefs at Casablanca and he hardly discussed with them the "unconditional surrender" formula which he announced at the conference. The American planners as a consequence were in disarray. The result was complete victory for the British strategic conceptions. "Our ideas had prevailed almost throughout," wrote an exultant British general in his diary after the conference.⁶² Equally terse was the reaction of the chief American Army planner at the conference, General Albert Wedemeyer: "We came, we listened and we were conquered."⁶³ The war in early 1943 proceeded along the Mediterranean bias that TORCH had given it. The arguments of General Marshall and the Army staff had been unavailing, and, in many ways, the

⁶¹Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-382. See also Gordon A. Harrison, *The European Theatre of Operations: Cross-Channel Attack* (Washington, D. C., 1951), pp. 37-38.

⁶²Quoted from the diary of Brigadier Ian Jacob in Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, p. 561.

⁶³Cline, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

Casablanca conference was a low point in the cooperation between the President and his military advisers.

Such disagreements, after Casablanca, became exceptions to the rule. Roosevelt, it is true, overruled his chiefs at the Cairo conferences on the proposed Burma and Bay of Bengal operations (ANAKIM-BUCCANEER) and in the summer of 1944 he made his weight felt—although to what effect is still not altogether clear—in the controversy over the Formosa-Philippines issue in the Pacific theatre.⁶⁴ But the low point at Casablanca was also the turning point. In the later conferences of the war, Mr. Roosevelt in ever growing measure came to accept and sponsor the strategic views of the American staff and, when support was required, proved willing to support them in their arguments against Churchill and the British chiefs. In this the President's role was perhaps made easier by an increased willingness on the part of the Joint Chiefs to meet their British colleagues half-way. Aware after Casablanca that invasion of northwestern Europe must in any event be postponed until 1944 the American chiefs were willing during 1943 to compromise their position on the Mediterranean although they never gave up their view that strategically the Mediterranean was a diversion of Allied resources. In return for their concessions they sought in turn a firm British commitment to the BOLERO concept and at length they won such a commitment. It was not an easy victory, for the

British to the very end were reluctant to hazard a cross-channel invasion,⁶⁵ but the American chiefs' hands were strengthened in controversy by Roosevelt's sudden and rather surprising adherence to their strategic conceptions in the months after Casablanca. At the TRIDENT conference (Washington, May 1943) Roosevelt for the first time pressed on Mr. Churchill the merits of BOLERO and at the first Quebec conference (July 1943), in Secretary Stimson's exultant words, "The President went the whole hog on the subject of ROUNDHAMMER [i.e. BOLERO]. He was more clear and definite than I have ever seen him since we have been in this war and he took the policy that the American staff have been fighting for fully."⁶⁶ Once tardily converted to BOLERO, Roosevelt remained its advocate and, as a logical consequence, opposed—although never intransigently—British schemes for widening the war in the Mediterranean theatre. His tenacity was impressive. A British proposal in October 1943 to seize Rhodes, Cos and Leros was rejected by Roosevelt on the ground that it might divert forces from operations in Italy or from the projected cross-channel assault—eight months before the event!⁶⁷ At the Cairo-Teheran conferences, the President was no less zealous than the American chiefs in protecting the BOLERO concept, now entitled OVERLORD, from the threat of diversions in the Mediterranean, and he was even more zealous than they in protecting it and the Mediterranean theatre from the threatened diversion of a Burma campaign, overruling the Joint Chiefs on this point. Meeting Secretary Stimson on his return from Cairo, Roosevelt observed, "I have thus brought OVERLORD back to you safe

⁶⁴The President's dramatic trip to meet General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor was probably not unconnected with the 1944 election campaign. Despite this trip it does not appear that the President intervened in the controversy between the Army and Navy staffs and their leaders over the question of whether to invade or to "by-pass" the Philippines. Some Army planners, however, had at the time the distinct impression that a Presidential intervention might not have been unlikely had the decision gone for Formosa, as the Navy planners had argued, rather than for the Philippines, General MacArthur's preferred objective.

⁶⁵See e.g. Kennedy, *The Business of War*, p. 305, 314.

⁶⁶Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

⁶⁷Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 211-212.

and sound on the ways for accomplishment."⁶⁸

After a delay of more than a year the Allied war effort turned in 1943 into the channels which the American staff had marked out at the beginning. And the President's support for their European strategy, belatedly given, was never thereafter withdrawn. The new concurrence between President and Joint Chiefs in the months after the TRIDENT conference did not "shut down" the Mediterranean theatre of war, much as some American planners would have liked to do that. American insistence on OVERLORD did not indeed prevent some concessions on the part of the Joint Chiefs to British-backed projects in that theatre in late 1943 and 1944. Assured after Teheran that OVERLORD would be carried out and strengthened by their newly-won Presidential support, the American Joint Chiefs proved willing, with some protest, to delay their OVERLORD shipping schedules to accommodate the shipping needs for the Anzio landing and to provide some, although much regretted, American reinforcements for the Italian theatre. Other less weighty concessions were made to the British. All in all, the American staffs displayed more flexibility in their dealings with their British allies in the later stages of the war than had earlier been the case, and Allied amity prospered. On the major points, however, the American chiefs were firm in defending their established strategic conceptions and in 1944 and 1945 they enjoyed almost without an exception the support of their Commander-in-Chief. Roosevelt backed the chiefs in the controversy over the diversion of the Southern France invasion,⁶⁹ he supported their refusal to reinforce and widen the Italian theatre in

August 1944,⁷⁰ he backed them and their principal subordinate General Eisenhower in the controversies of the European command structure.⁷¹ On the major issue of the war's close—the question of dealing with growing Russian aggressiveness—the views of Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs were identical. It is difficult, as always, to say how far the President's unreadiness, even under provocation, to deal harshly with Stalin in 1944 and 1945 reflected the *advice* of the chiefs. But their advice, solicited by Secretary Hull as early as May 1944, coincided with Roosevelt's own inclinations in the matter, though it was of course based on quite different considerations and there was on this great question an effective unanimity of opinion.⁷² It is very doubtful if the "deadly hiatus" in spring of 1945 between the authority of the dying Roosevelt and the authority of his successor Mr. Truman, so much regretted by Mr. Churchill, had great influence on the movement of events in Europe during early 1945. If one may judge from the relations of Roosevelt and his chiefs through late 1943 and 1944, the President, had he lived, would most probably have backed his military staff in the discussion with the British over the questions of Prague, Berlin and a *détente* with the Russians no less sturdily than President Truman was to do. He may have made a mistake in his dealings with the Russians and Stalin's rudeness and suspiciousness in 1945 grieved and angered him. But Roosevelt was ever reluctant to admit his mistakes and

⁷⁰ Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 122-127, 221-225.

⁷¹ Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, VI, 87-94.

⁷² Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, D. C., 1955), pp. 106-108. In this document the Joint Chiefs argue that the United States should at all costs avoid the appearance of an Anglo-American *entente* in Europe and that "our basic national policy . . . should seek to maintain the solidarity of the three great powers."

⁶⁸ Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

⁶⁹ Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, V, 353-355, 357, 367.

it was late in the game.⁷³

How can we explain this reversal in the Commander-in-Chief's role during the latter period of the war? It is never easy for the historian to establish motives, and Roosevelt, as so many of his associates have recorded, concealed his motives more deeply than most men. The chiefs themselves, dealing as they were intimately with Roosevelt during the war years, never fully comprehended the train of reasoning which led him to accept and support their strategic views after TRIDENT and the first Quebec conference. It is difficult to decide on the historical record. More reliant in the early days on the counsels of Harry Hopkins than on the advice of his military chiefs, Roosevelt in 1943 seemingly developed greater confidence in the judgment of his chiefs than he had had in 1942 and more particularly in the pre war period. It is possible, too, that as the war wore on he developed a greater confidence in their subordination. If Roosevelt found little reason to overrule his chiefs in the latter phases of the war, this is in some part attributable to the fact that the chiefs, after their experiences over TORCH and Casablanca, were perhaps more sensitive to the President's leanings and strategic tendencies than they had been in 1942. And the liaison between them and the White House grew closer. As one student of the Joint Chiefs, Captain Tracy B. Kittredge, has observed,

It may be true that the President formally overruled them on very few occasions but this was only because informal discussions of the President with Leahy, Marshall, King and Arnold usually led them to know in advance the President's views. They no doubt frequently recognized the advantages of ac-

cepting the President's suggestions with their own interpretations, rather than of risking an overruling by presenting formally proposals they knew would not be accepted.⁷⁴

The growing confidence between President and the Joint Chiefs was influenced, after the Allied victories in Tunis and Guadalcanal and the defeat of the submarine campaign in 1943, by another important factor—the change in the shape of the war. With the sea lanes secured and North Africa and Guadalcanal in our grasp, the defensive phase of the war came to an end in all the theatres. With the strategic initiative in our possession and the growing weight of American forces making itself increasingly felt in our relations with the British, we were in 1943 presented for the first time during the war with true strategic alternatives. Before 1943 the American chiefs and their planners, alarmed by the scatter of our forces in defensive fighting all over the world, attempted by basic strategic decisions to wrest the initiative from an enemy everywhere victorious by challenging him, not on the scenes of his successes—the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean—but in a theatre of our own choice where, it was argued, we might fight him at advantage; Secretary Stimson accurately reflected the dominant views of the American strategists when, in a paraphrase of John Sherman's celebrated remark, he told the President in March 1942 that "the only way to get the initiative in this war is to take it."⁷⁵ This was broadly speaking the logic of the BOLERO plan. It was a bold conception. But BOLERO was doomed by the fact that, logical though it was, it took little account either of the specific strategic problems or of the established strategic views of the British leaders and

⁷³Samuel I. Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt* (New York, 1953), pp. 504, 526-527, 539. Rosenman argues that Roosevelt was puzzled and upset by Stalin's actions in the spring of 1945 but that he was in some ways no less suspicious of Churchill's postwar intentions than he was of Stalin's.

⁷⁴Quoted in Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 948.

⁷⁵Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

they, feeling rightly or wrongly that BOLERO was the result more of strategic impulse than of strategic analysis, felt compelled to oppose it and ultimately were successful, as we have seen, in overthrowing it with the President's support.⁷⁶ Roosevelt, like the chiefs, wished to defeat Germany decisively and as quickly as possible; unlike them, however, he gave first priority in 1942 to the maintenance and solidifying of the Anglo-American coalition which the controversies over BOLERO and TORCH had placed under great strain.

In the later stages of the war the strategic situation changed as Allied forces moved onto the offensive. At the same time Roosevelt's gaze shifted from the Anglo-American coalition to the broader question of American relations with Russia and the complementary question of America's role in post-war Europe. As these considerations came to the fore the political motives which impelled the President increasingly reinforced, in 1943 and afterwards, the primarily strategic and logistical motives which had originally moved the chiefs to put forward BOLERO. The consequence was a close concurrence of political and military views in the American high command during the last two years of the war, perhaps the most important factor in bringing Roosevelt's views together with the views of his military advisers. This is a factor worthy of some examination. From the beginning of the war, the President's cardinal aim in the European theatre was to avoid

American embroilment in the tangled and melancholy political affairs of Central and Eastern Europe. As Mr. Herbert Feis has well said,

"The President wanted to keep clear of responsibility for the future pattern of relationships within Central and Eastern Europe, since he feared that it might lead to a call to keep American troops in Europe permanently. . . he continued [throughout the war] to restrain official interest in Eastern and Central European matters except as they might affect sentiment in the United States. He was determined to have a lot to say . . . about the settlements in the Pacific. But, since he thought it was nearly impossible to find happy solutions for many European problems, he wanted to remain as clear of them as he could, except for those involving Germany."⁷⁷

It was a cornerstone of Roosevelt's policy, settled in his own mind from an early date, that the American people would be unwilling, and the American government therefore unable, to provide occupation troops in Europe for any lengthy period after the end of the war, that such occupation troops as we might provide would be limited to Germany alone, and that American strategy therefore should avoid situations which might make American occupation troops necessary for an indefinite period. This policy arose not only out of the President's natural concern over the great portending burdens of the Japanese war following victory in Europe, weighty though that motive was. It arose from Roosevelt's disinclination, based upon his reading of American public opinion, to ensnare American troops and American interests in the troublous affairs of Europe—a Europe, with, as he had put it in one of his prewar speeches, its "ancient hatreds, turbulent frontiers, the 'legacy of old forgotten, far-off things and

⁷⁶Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-191. At the time of the original BOLERO discussions in London Field Marshal Brooke felt that the American staff had not thought the plan through and that General Marshall had started BOLERO merely as a counter to the drains which Admiral King and General MacArthur placed upon American military resources: Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, p. 358. Brooke's hunch was a shrewd one. BOLERO was an American Army project which the Navy supported but never felt wedded to: see Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, pp.93-94.

⁷⁷Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin*, pp. 212, 451.

battles long ago' . . . [and] its new-born fanaticisms."⁷⁸

As concerned the complex political affairs of postwar Europe, Roosevelt like the great majority of his countrymen was still part an isolationist. As he put it in a letter to Mr. Stettinius in February 1944,

"I do not want the United States to have the post-war burden of reconstituting France, Italy and the Balkans. This is not our natural task at a distance of 3500 miles or more. It is definitely a British task in which the British are far more vitally interested than we are. From the point of view of the United States, our principal object is not to take part in the internal problems of Southern Europe but is rather to take part in eliminating Germany at a possible and even probable cost of a third World War."⁷⁹

Quite apart from the prefigured burdens of the Pacific war, American war policy in Europe throughout was haunted by the spectre of a recurrent isolationism in the post-war period.⁸⁰ Fear that Russian intransigence would alienate American public opinion was perhaps as strong a motive for Roosevelt's concessions to Stalin as his desire to increase the Soviet's sense of security. His sense of the fragility of the American will to intervene in European affairs colored Roosevelt's public depiction of American war aims and it underlay the urgency with which he sought to establish the United Nations Organization during the war, before isolationist sentiment had an opportunity to reassert itself.

These fears and prepossessions greatly influenced Mr. Roosevelt's approach to questions of European strategy. He had led the American people through the crises of 1940-1941 and into a world war. But even this

master of the moods and impulses of American public opinion doubted his ability to lead his countrymen further into world affairs and to persuade them to take up the cares and responsibilities of the peace. At the Teheran conference, for instance, Roosevelt, who had proposed the wartime Big Four as the guardians of the new peace, informed Stalin that in event of any postwar European crisis the United States would limit her intervention to planes and ships but that no American ground troops could be sent.⁸¹ He was reluctant even to permit *any* American forces to remain on occupation duty in Europe after the war. At the Yalta conference he placed a limit of two years on occupation forces and in earlier discussions with his staff he had indicated that an occupation of only one year would be the more grateful to him.⁸² In November 1943 in preparatory conferences with the Joint Chiefs before the Cairo-Teheran meetings he had informed the chiefs that we could accept no responsibilities for furnishing occupation troops outside Germany proper and warned them that "we should not get roped into accepting any European sphere of influence."⁸³ As a consequence he refused at first to provide American occupation forces for Austria and was won away from this stand only in December 1944 on the strong representations of Mr. Winant. Similarly he wished, in defiance of military logic, to place the postwar American zone of occupation in northwestern Germany, as far as possible from Central European affairs, a project which in view of the position of the British armies on the American left flank during the campaign in Germany would have necessitated an impossibly difficult shifting and shuttling of British and American troops in

⁷⁸Speech at Chataqua, 14 August 1936, in Samuel I. Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York, 1938), V, 289.

⁷⁹Cordell Hull, *Memoirs* (London, 1948), p. 1612.

⁸⁰See e.g. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 270.

⁸²Department of State, *Yalta Documents*, p. 617.

⁸³Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, p. 92 n. 27.

the postwar period.⁸⁴ The war once ended, American forces, Roosevelt felt, must withdraw from Europe and our campaigns in Europe should be planned and fought in such a way as to facilitate their early disengagement. In Roosevelt's opinion, American military intervention in World War II did not imply clear postwar responsibilities in Europe and in any event American opinion would not accept such responsibilities. This was a political decision from which Roosevelt never moved; it was strongly held and it was influential.

Roosevelt's distaste for even a temporary American involvement in postwar European politics was doubtless a powerful factor in the approval he gave to the BOLERO-OVERLORD concept. It formed the basis of the President's European policy. More important for our purpose, this political course of action based upon the President's judgment of the likely temper of postwar public opinion in the United States—a remarkably accurate judgment, it might be added—complemented the plans of American military planners for a short and decisive campaign in Europe. Founded though the political motive was on considerations quite distinct from those underlying BOLERO-OVERLORD, the one reinforced and buttressed the other. The disagreements between the President and his staff during the earlier stages of the war arose less over the issues and the soundness of the American strategic conception than over a question of timing. In the latter stages of the war, this source of disagreement between Roosevelt and his military chieftains was removed. If political reasons had counselled in 1942 that American force be diverted into the Mediterranean basin to support, directly, the faltering effort of our British ally and, indirectly, the Rus-

sians in their summer of disaster, political reasons in the changed circumstances of 1943 argued no less strongly that, for the reasons we have seen, those Mediterranean efforts should not be extended into the Balkans or South-Central Europe. Roosevelt for reasons of his own was no less chary of involvement in Yugoslavia and Central Europe than the Joint Chiefs. In this judgment, Mr. Roosevelt, again for reasons of his own, found himself in agreement with the strategic and logistical arguments of his military advisers and willing therefore to support them. In the later states of the European war, then, American policy and American strategy flowed along in a merging stream, the result less of an identity than of a congruity of motives. And in the high tides of victory in 1944 and 1945, the President was, after his own fashion, no less stalwart in opposing the strategic views of the British and in backing his own military staffs than he had been independent in his exercise of the powers of Commander-in-Chief during the earlier stages of World War II.

IV

The time has not yet come for the historian to pass full judgment on Franklin Roosevelt's discharge of his responsibilities as the American Commander-in-Chief. The events of World War II are still too recent and relatively too poorly documented for that. Only with the passage of much time and the completion of much work will the military historian undertake this task with anything other than great diffidence. Even so, enough is known and enough has been said—much of it right, much of it wrong—about Roosevelt's war presidency, to permit some tentative and general conclusions to be brought forward. First and most important, the prevailing harmony of view between Roosevelt and his military chieftains in the latter stages

⁸⁴Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 621.

of World War II has left an impression of his war leadership which is somewhat at variance with the facts of the matter. As in so many things connected with the brilliant and mercurial Roosevelt, the appearances differ from the realities. His casual manner of dealing with great issues and his ingrained methods of dealing with—and surviving!—his subordinates proved more than once during his presidency to have been misleading to the observer unacquainted with the man. This was markedly the case in Roosevelt's exercise of his military powers. Students of the war, by concentrating their attention too closely upon its closing stages, have presented a picture of a Commander-in-Chief concerned only to win the war in the military sense as quickly and cheaply as possible and too responsive therefore to purely military advices, while ignoring those long-range political aspects which make up, or should make up, so large a part of war. Thus as one student of American civil-military relations in World War II, Professor Huntington, has put it, "so far as the major decisions of policy and strategy were concerned, the military ran the war."⁸⁵ And as another critic of Roosevelt's policies, the military analyst Hanson Baldwin, has observed, "We forgot that politico-military is a compound word."⁸⁶

Now, "politico-military" affairs are complicated and tangled and not easy to distinguish clearly one from the other. And "major decisions," too, are difficult to isolate from minor decisions, the more so if they are made—as so many of Roosevelt's decisions were made—by default rather than dramatic actions. But if Roosevelt's war leadership is viewed as a whole, and proper stress laid on its early and middle phases, somewhat differ-

ent conclusions will emerge. Roosevelt took seriously his powers as Commander-in-Chief. None of our war presidents has grasped those powers more firmly than Franklin Roosevelt or wielded them with more assurance. Their use and their influence were not always obvious and Roosevelt was far more sparing in their use than Churchill was in the exercise of his powers as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. In most instances, when his military subordinates presented him with agreed recommendations, Roosevelt tended to follow them providing they did not conflict with his political purposes as, for example, they did conflict during the period of prewar rearmament; he concerned himself very little with the development and movement of Pacific strategy, for example. When his military chieftains could not agree among themselves, as at the Casablanca conference, the President merely followed his own course, for at no time was he solely dependent on their counsels; unanimity among the Joint Chiefs was a rule which events, not Mr. Roosevelt himself, imposed. Where high political affairs—especially those bearing upon the affairs of the coalition—came in question, Roosevelt's intervention, as we have seen, could be decisive and powerful. His chiefs, it is true, had great freedom and great authority. But if Roosevelt's relations with his military subordinates were more even in tenor than those subsisting between his great English colleague and his chiefs, Roosevelt's ascendancy over his chiefs was no less real and his control, indirect but persuasive, over the major decisions of the war no less marked. As the presidential Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, has recalled in his reminiscences of the war,

There were two men at the top who really fought out and finally agreed on the major moves that led to victory. They were Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. They really ran the war. Of course, they had to

⁸⁵Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

⁸⁶Hanson Baldwin, *Great Mistakes of the War* (New York, 1950), p. 26.

have some people like us to help them, but we were just artisans building definite patterns of strategy from the rough blueprints handed us by our respective Commanders-in-Chief.⁸⁷

At the same time a study of Roosevelt's wartime role does very little to diminish the basic ambiguity in the Commander-in-Chief's powers and it is difficult, in World War II as in earlier American wars, to trace clearly the line separating the actions of the President from the actions of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the more the case because Roosevelt, with some important exceptions, exercised the Commander-in-Chief's powers as indirectly and with as much adroitness as he exercised his other powers. In the field of strategy, as had been his wont in domestic politics, his preferred role was that of mediator, drifting with apparent casualness between the conflicting pressures and the divergent views which global war produced and attempting to reconcile differing opinions rather than attempting, as Churchill did, to impose his own strategic conceptions. Disdaining argument with subordinates, reluctant as the politician generally is to undertake long-range commitments, Roosevelt employed his powers as Commander-in-Chief in their true but negative function, using them as the shield and buckler of his presidential powers and his presidential policies. At any rate, a study of his wartime role suggests that his interventions in the *hows* and *wheres* and *whens* of strategy arose principally from a desire to protect and, in Roosevelt's view, to further his political objectives. In the period before Pearl Harbor his political motive was to deter the aggressors by a display of American rearmament and of military support for the Allies. In the defensive phase of the war his primary aim was to hold the coalition together under the enemy's hammer

blows. In the days of victory he sought to limit the extent of America's postwar responsibilities in Europe and to transfer American power as quickly and completely as possible to the war against Japan and, in this last part of the war, that motive led Roosevelt's strategic views, such as they were, to coincide fully for the first time since 1938 with the professional views of his military chieftains.

In all three of these great periods of World War II the political motive was uppermost in Roosevelt's mind. And in all three of them it was a dominating political motive which was by and large negative rather than positive in character. Critics of his war policies have perhaps given this fact too little consideration. Roosevelt's great war colleagues Churchill and Stalin were both moved by positive motives arising from their desires to strengthen, in war, the postwar military position of their empires. From beginning to end, Roosevelt's motives were very largely negative ones—to prevent war if possible by a show of American strength and resoluteness; to limit the spread of the war after 1939 by deterring the Japanese in the Pacific and aiding the allies in Europe; and, finally, to fight the war after 1941 in such fashion as to weld together the wartime coalition for the purposes of peace while committing the American people as little as possible to the perplexities of post-war European politics.

Animated by these powerful though negative motives, Roosevelt was far more sensitive than is generally realized to the political aspects of the war; and he performed truly the function of the American Commander-in-Chief which is to bind together the varied political and military strands which make up war, keeping each in its proper relation to the whole. If criticism must fall upon his war presidency it probably should fall upon

⁸⁷Leahy, *I Was There*, p. 106.

the soundness and realism of his political motives rather than upon his military actions as Commander-in-Chief. For in 1945, after a war which was on the whole soundly conceived and prosecuted, Roosevelt's—and American—hopes foundered upon the paradox of fighting a war of total victory for political purposes essentially conservative and negative in character. In the great events of 1939-1941 Roosevelt cautiously but bravely led forth the American nation from isolationism. As the melancholy postwar events were to show, he failed in fact to replace isolationism with a true and coherent alternative policy and he seems indeed to have been pessimistic about the ability and willingness of the American people to shoulder new, weighty and, as the event has shown, unavoidable responsibilities. The great defect of his policies arose from the fact that he seemingly hoped, in the changed world of 1945, to pursue a course of action which would preserve many of the benefits, while avoiding the disadvantages, of isolationism. Through-

out World War II his actions as Commander-in-Chief were consistent with these goals of policy. Events since then have plainly shown that his goals were inadequate and lacking in realism. But what was generally considered to be adequate and realistic *at the time* is another thing.

The poet warns that

What's done we oftentimes may compute
But know not what's prevented.

More so than appear in the afterlight of our great victories, World War II was for the allies a war of narrowly averted disasters, of harsh choices and of somewhat disheartening possibilities, truly "an option of difficulties," in General Wolfe's words. Historians of the future, sitting in judgment on Franklin Roosevelt's war presidency, may perhaps conclude that what was prevented was more important than what was done and that his military and political leadership of the coalition, given the conditions under which they were exercised, were sounder than his statesmanship.

Naval and Maritime History Documents Wanted

The United States Navy Department has announced plans to collect and publish the much scattered documents relating to the naval and maritime history of the American Revolution. William Bell Clark will edit the work. The Navy Department states that a major contribution to the success of the project can be made by anyone possessing or knowing of unpublished letters, diaries, reports, ships' logs, and other naval documents for the years 1775-1785, and who will make such material or information available to the Director of Naval History, Rear Admiral E. M. Eller, USN (Ret.), Navy Department, Washington 25, D. C.

Dornbusch on New Bibliography

C. E. Dornbusch is at it again. He tells us that he is now engaged in compiling a revised bibliography on *State Participation in the Civil War*. During the year he compiled and issued *Unit Histories of the United States Air Forces* (Hampton Books, Hampton Bays, N. Y., 1958). This bibliography of 64 pages gives detailed descriptions of 265 unit histories and privately printed narratives of both World Wars. His standard work, *Histories of American Army Units*, was published by the Department of the Army two years ago but is now out of print.

THE ARMY AND THE STRATEGIC BOMBER

1930 — 1939

By ROBERT W. KRAUSKOPF*

Part II

VIII

The effort to translate planned B-17's into actual B-17's, however, was a task of herculean magnitude and endless frustrations, as the Air Corps learned in the three years that followed the decision to explore the possibilities of this model. The views of the War Department and the Air Corps during this period diverged on three fundamental questions: (a) the relative effectiveness and economy of four-engine as opposed to twin-engine bombers; (b) the relative importance of tactical support aviation and strategic aviation; and, in the last year, 1938, (c) the desirability of beginning research and development work on a replacement for the B-17, to possess superior characteristics. The failure to reconcile this divergence of views effectively hampered the procurement of heavy bombers until the very outbreak of war in Europe in 1939.

The first point was the subject of a request by the General Staff in the summer of 1935 to the Chief of the Air Corps and the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force; it asked for their comments on the advantages and disadvantages of comparatively few long-range heavy bombers as opposed to a relatively larger number of shorter range medium bombers.⁷⁵

Both General Westover and General Andrews saw the advantages lying exclusively with the heavy bomber. Westover compared the standard B-10 with the projected XB-15 and concluded that the latter had four times the striking power of the former, but whereas four B-10's cost \$400,000, one XB-15, if procured in quantity, would cost only \$175,000. From the standpoint of economy, thus, the use of the XB-15 meant a unit saving of \$225,000, with no loss of effectiveness. To operate and service each XB-15 would take twice the personnel needed for a B-10, but assuming again a four-to-one ratio of striking power, the XB-15 would give an actual saving. The performance of the XB-15 was expected to exceed that of the B-10 in all categories, especially in range and load carrying capacity. It could perform long-range missions far beyond the capacity of the B-10, but with its interchangeability of bomb and fuel loads, it could perform short-range missions also, and with greater effectiveness. The XB-15 was a large target, it was true, but Westover reasoned that its high speed, superior armament, and greater operating ceiling would actually make it less vulnerable to attack. Both officers were agreed that the peculiar strategic and geographic situation of the United States made our need for extremely long-range aircraft greater than that of any other country. Andrews went on to the extreme of proposing that *all* future development of bombers in the United States

*Editorial Note: Part I appeared in *Military Affairs*, XXII, 2, pp. 83-94.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, file AG 452.1 (11-3-33) (1) Sec. 2, memorandum dated June 17, 1935.

be directed toward still greater increases in range and bomb carrying capacity.⁷⁶

For the B-17, when it came under consideration, similar advantages were foreseen, but not on the same scale. The effectiveness of one B-17 was reckoned by the Air Corps as the equivalent of two medium bombers rather than four, but this fact did not deter a serious recommendation that the smaller types "should be discarded as fast as replacement can be made. . . ."⁷⁷

The attitude of the General Staff at this time was not unfavorable to the claims advanced by the Air Corps. It felt that the research and development work of the Air Corps had, indeed, yielded superior aircraft types and that it would be unwise not to procure those types. If the XB-15 came up to expectations, its opinion was that the requirements previously laid down by the Drum Board⁷⁸ should be revised to allow the procurement of as many as the Air Corps advised and funds permitted.⁷⁹

One year later, however, this sympathetic, cooperative attitude had vanished. In considering estimates for the fiscal year 1938 the Chief of the Air Corps again advocated procuring "some" of the still untried XB-15 model, and, as an interim type, pending the service test of the XB-15, recommended ordering sufficient B-17's to equip at least two groups, one for the east coast, one for the west coast. G-4, however, emphatically dissented. It believed that "long-range, high-cost" bombers were not required and that only medium bombers, "operating in support

of our Navy and mobile land forces" were needed. These were capable of attacking "any hostile naval or land based aviation within effective range of our vital strategic areas." Disregarding Westover's earlier standard of relative effectiveness, it cited higher initial cost and excessive demands in the way of personnel, maintenance, and base facilities as decisive disadvantages of the larger type.⁸⁰

This line of policy was reinforced at a General Staff conference on army bombardment aircraft, held on August 28, 1936, at which Generals Westover and Andrews were present. Both air officers argued strongly for continued emphasis upon development of the four-engine bomber as the most effective weapon for execution of the Air Corps mission. The conclusions of the conference, however were that the "maximum requirements of bombardment aviation for operation with the mobile army, the reinforcement of Hawaii and the direct defense of the coast" were for a type having approximately the characteristics of the B-17; of these it foresaw the need for no more than about eighty. Project A and Project D, in other words, were finished as far as the General Staff was concerned. The "bulk of bombardment aviation operating with the mobile army," the conference held, should be of about the size and capacity of the standard B-18 medium bomber.⁸¹

Throughout the next two years this see-saw struggle over the long-range bomber continued. In the summer of 1937, as contracts for the 1937 quota of bombers were about to be awarded, General Andrews, the most outspoken champion of the B-17, returned to the attack with a strong statement of his position:

If budget limitations require a reduction in the total number of airplanes to be procured as a re-

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, replies of July 12, 1935 (Westover) and July 22, 1935 (Andrews).

⁷⁷NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (5-9-35) (1), memorandum of October 9, 1935, from Office of the Chief of the Air Corps for information of G-4.

⁷⁸See above, p. 16, n. 32. The Drum Board had recommended a strength of 2,320 aircraft as the goal of future Air Corps procurement; of these, 400 were to be bombers. (NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (5-9-35) (1), G-4 memorandum of October 18, 1935, for Chief of Staff).

⁷⁹*Ibid.*

⁸⁰NA, RG 94, file AG 111 (10-10-35) (1) Sec. 2, G-4 memorandum of June 16, 1936.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, file AG 452.1 (5-8-35) (1), G-4 memorandum of September 14, 1936, for Chief of Staff.

sult of the increased initial cost of the four engined bomber, I still urge that all present procurement of reconnaissance and bombardment airplanes be confined to the four-engined model. Mere numbers of airplanes, in my opinion, are of less importance than the provision of such smaller numbers as funds will permit, provided the airplanes that are procured are . . . the most efficient, the most modern, and the best basic air defense weapon that the industry can produce.⁸²

Such pleas made no impression upon the War Department. One year later, when the Air Corps made its request for funds for two YB-20 bombers, the improved version of the XB-15,⁸³ General Embick, the Deputy Chief of Staff, registered his vigorous objection to the whole long-range bomber concept in these words:

The military superiority of a plane the size of even the B-17 over the two or three smaller ships that can be procured with the same funds, remains to be established, in view of the vulnerability, air base limitations, and complexity of operation, of the former type.

If the equipment to be provided for the Army Air Corps be that best adapted to carry out the specific functions appropriately assigned it under Joint Action as an integral part of the national defense team, there would appear to be no need for a plane larger than the B-17, and only the relatively small number of the latter desirable as potential reinforcing units for Oahu or Panama.⁸⁴

Shortly afterward, at General Embick's instigation, the whole subject was referred to the Joint Board for study. On June 29, 1938, the latter submitted a policy statement largely confirming General Staff views. It saw no likelihood, based on the existing strategic situation, that the Air Corps would be called upon in time of war to perform any missions requiring the use of heavy bombers of greater capabilities than the B-17. On the other hand, the Air Corps was sure to be

called upon to perform many missions that lay within the capabilities of aircraft of the less expensive medium bomber type. In its considered opinion, therefore, there was no justification for procurement of aircraft larger than the B-17, and the larger proportion of Army bombardment and reconnaissance aviation ought to be composed of aircraft smaller than the B-17.⁸⁵

IX

The application of the General Staff's restrictive policy was reflected in the quantities of B-17's the Air Corps found it possible to obtain from 1936 to 1938. The budget for the fiscal year 1937 provided for 26 to be procured, whereas the Air Corps had originally requested 60.⁸⁶ In August 1936, however, the Secretary of War advised General Westover that it was inadvisable to go through with orders for these aircraft until the initial group of 13 Y1B-17's had been delivered and given proper service tests; provision for their procurement would therefore be made instead in the 1938 budget.⁸⁷ Four months later the War Department eliminated B-17's entirely from the 1938 budget, substituting 44 twin-engine bombers at the same total cost.⁸⁸

The unqualified success of the first examples of the Y1B-17 when they entered service in the GHQ Air Force changed matters again and gave the Air Corps ground for pleading "that an additional small quan-

⁸⁵J.B. No. 349 (Serial 629), Subject: Limitation of Development of Army Bombardment and Reconnaissance Aviation, dated June 29, 1938 (*Ibid.*)

⁸⁶NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (6-1-37) (1), 2nd indorsement, June 9, 1937, on Andrews letter of June 1, 1937, to The Adjutant General, by General Arnold.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, file AG 452.1 (12-4-36), Memorandum by General Westover for Chief of Staff, December 4, 1936.

⁸⁸Letter from Budget Officer, War Department, to Chief of Air Corps, December 5, 1936, cited by General Arnold in his 2nd indorsement, June 9, 1937, to General Andrews' letter of June 1, 1937 to The Adjutant General (*Ibid.*, file AG 452.1 (6-1-37) (1)).

⁸²*Ibid.*, file AG 452.1 (6-1-37) (1), Andrews to The Adjutant General, June 1, 1937.

⁸³See Part I, p. 92.

⁸⁴NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (4-6-36), Deputy Chief of Staff's memorandum of May 9, 1938, for G-4.

tity of these airplanes be purchased at this time."⁸⁹ The General Staff was impressed but would make no immediate decision. By July 1937 the Air Corps had sufficient confidence in its case to raise its request again to the original figure of 26, the quantity desired for the organization of two groups.⁹⁰ A few weeks later the General Staff acquiesced,⁹¹ and these 26, designated B-17B, were contracted for in the autumn of 1937.⁹²

For the fiscal year 1939 the War Department directed that the only bombers to be procured would be 91 of the twin-engine type. For this purpose it announced a competition in November 1937, with bids to be opened in February 1939. None of the aircraft manufacturers circularized was willing to build a bomber to meet the specifications, however, so the War Department in June 1938 declared the competition cancelled. It determined instead to meet the 1939 requirements by procuring all aircraft available under option clauses of existing contracts; these permitted the ordering of 78 more Douglas B-18A's and 13 more Boeing B-17B's.⁹³ Thus, more by accident than intent, the trickle of B-17's from Seattle was augmented a little more, and the Air Corps found itself, on the eve of the Munich crisis, with the magnificent total of 52 B-17's on hand or on order.⁹⁴ In contrast, the twin-engine Douglas B-18 and B-18A, a medium bomber type with no particular claim to dis-

tingtion, but for which the General Staff had consistently shown a preference, had been the subject of contracts for a total of 350 aircraft over the same chronological period.⁹⁵

Meanwhile, the Air Corps, conscious of the difficulties involved in having no systematic plan of replenishment and expansion to follow, attempted, early in 1938, to formulate a comprehensive, long-range procurement program designed to bring it up, by regular stages, to the Drum Board's recommended strength of 2,320 aircraft. The results of this study were embodied in the so-called "Woodring Program," which was approved by the War Department March 18, 1938. In the bombardment category, the Woodring Program fixed a proportion of 144 heavy, four-engine bombers to 525 medium bombers and attack bombers as the ultimate objective, and provided for the procurement of 67 of the heavy bombers in the fiscal year 1940.⁹⁶

Aware of the fact that the design of the B-17 was now four years old and of the need to assure the availability for future procurement of a type equal or superior to foreign developments, the Air Corps requested authority to start design work on a new four-engine high-altitude bomber. The military characteristics of this type, as submitted to the War Department for approval in May 1938 called for a weight of about 35 tons, range of 4,000 miles with a 4,000-lb. bomb load, and the ability, with a pressurized cabin, of flying at 30,000 ft.⁹⁷

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, file AG 452.1 (6-7-37), letter from Materiel Division, Wright Field, to Chief of Air Corps, June 7, 1937.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, file AG 452.1 (4-6-36), 2nd indorsement, July 22, 1937, General Arnold to the Chief of the Air Corps, on original letter of May 10, 1937, same to same.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, G-4 memorandum for The Adjutant General, September 3, 1937.

⁹²*Aircraft Yearbook, 1938* (New York: Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America, 1938), p. 264. *Aviation*, September 1937, p. 68; November 1937, p. 54.

⁹³NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (4-6-36), Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of War to the Chief of the Air Corps, June 8, 1938.

⁹⁴To recapitulate: 13 Y1B-17, for service test, procured from fiscal year 1936 funds

26 B-17B, procured from fiscal year 1938 funds

13 B-17B, procured from fiscal year 1939 funds

⁹⁵Fahey, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁹⁶NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (11-3-33) (1) Sec. 2, G-4 memorandum of May 26, 1938, for Chief of Staff.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, file 112.05 (9-9-37) Sec. 1, memorandum of May 10, 1938. A direct development of this design concept some four years later was the Boeing B-29.

This was too much for the General Staff, which replied in no uncertain terms:

No military requirements exist for the procurement of an experimental Pressure Cabin Bomber in fiscal year 1939 or fiscal year 1940 of the size and type described . . . Experimentation and development for fiscal year 1939 and fiscal year 1940 will be restricted to that class of aviation designed for the close support of ground troops and the protection of that type of aircraft such as medium and light bombers, pursuit or other light aircraft.⁹⁸

This was only the beginning. The Chief of Staff, General Malin Craig, directed G-4 simultaneously to eliminate all B-17's from the aircraft requirements program for the fiscal year 1940 and to divert funds intended for this type to the procurement of attack and light bomber types. It was estimated that the \$23,500,000 the Air Corps had requested for 67 B-17's, as provided by the Woodring Program, would allow the purchase instead of nearly 300 attack bombers.⁹⁹ The Air Corps was duly informed that, "as a result of further study" the approval heretofore given to the Woodring Program was withdrawn and that it should proceed to reformulate its estimates for the fiscal year 1940 without heavy bombers.¹⁰⁰

General Westover protested vigorously against this action. On general grounds, he insisted that without some comprehensive and progressive program to guide the Air Corps in its organization, procurement, construction, and training, and to keep all of these

interdependent factors balanced, there could be no continuity of effort and no efficient planning. The Woodring Program was intended to be, in his view, more than the "general guide" for future planning that the General Staff conceived it to be, and major modifications in it should not be made unless determined necessary by subsequent and equally comprehensive studies; budgetary limitations might require modifications, but only by way of deferment or minor adjustments. On the specific question of heavy bombers, he pointed out that the recent Joint Board study had not denied that the B-17 was a type required and suitable for the Air Corps and did not limit experimentation and development in the heavy bomber field.¹⁰¹

The General Staff deliberated at length before replying to Westover's objections. At last, four days before the Munich Conference, it delivered its carefully weighed judgment.¹⁰² With regard to four-engine bombers it remained inflexible: these would *not*, it reiterated, be included in the estimates for fiscal years 1940 and 1941. The 52 four-engine bombers already approved were sufficient for "reasonable peacetime training . . . and should not be materially augmented." It emphasized the growing threat of air attack upon the operations of ground troops, especially motorized and mechanized forces, and declared that

In the future development of aircraft and in the preparation of requirements as to types and numbers of aircraft, the Air Corps will therefore be guided by the desire of the War Department to obtain and develop aircraft suitable for the close support of ground troops to the same extent that now pertains with respect to types suitable for . . . strategic missions.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, memorandum by General Westover for Chief of Staff, August 31, 1938.

¹⁰²This and the following four paragraphs are based upon the War Department letter to the Chief of the Air Corps dated October 5, 1938, and the G-4 staff study of September 26, 1938, upon which it is based; both are filed in AG 580 (8-5-36). The staff paper bears General Craig's handwritten approval, "This is a very able study."

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, file AG 452.1 (11-3-33) (1) Sec. 2, memorandum of July 27, 1938, G-4 to Chief of Staff; Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-168; Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 36. Major E. N. Harmon, of G-4, protested this decision as unsound and short-sighted, but was overruled by General Embick, who stated he could not "conceive of a strategic situation in which such a plane would have a utility at all commensurate with its cost. Our limited development funds should be expended for more definite military objectives."

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, file AG 452.1 (4-6-36), G-4 memorandum of July 19, 1938, for Chief of Staff. General Craig, with evident satisfaction, annotated these documents in his own hand: "Col. Barnes—This is o.k. and solves the problem of 17-Bs [*sic*] vs. medium Bombers . . ."

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, file AG 580 (8-5-36), The Adjutant General to the Chief of the Air Corps, July 29, 1938.

One point only did it reluctantly concede. In order to provide suitable future replacements for the standard B-17 bomber, it rescinded the instructions it had imposed two months previously on future research and development in the heavy bomber field.

The General Staff saw nothing binding or mandatory in the Woodring Program, which the Chief of the Air Corps might continue to use as a guide, no more, in his annual request for funds. It claimed to be fully aware of the needs of the Air Corps but emphasized that the requirements of the other combat branches were equally important and their preparedness for action was of equal concern to the War Department. It refused to consider the Woodring Program as authorization "to augment the Air Corps beyond the state of readiness established for the other combat arms."

X

The time had passed, however, when such policies reflected the realities of the military situation. The logic of events had overtaken the War Department and was destroying the assumptions on which these decisions were based even before they were enunciated.

The Munich crisis marked the climax of a "cold war" campaign which the Nazis had waged chiefly on the basis of the potential threat embodied in their *Luftwaffe*. The impact of the débacle of Munich focused public attention as never before upon the crucial question of air power. It made governments everywhere look to their air defenses and begin to build them up with feverish haste.

The United States was no exception. President Roosevelt was shortly envisaging a United States air arm of 10,000 combat aircraft, supported by an annual production capacity of equal proportions.¹⁰³ On a more practical level, the Air Corps, less than three weeks after Munich, was asked by the Secre-

tary of War to submit preliminary plans for expanding its strength by no less than 4,000 aircraft,¹⁰⁴ and by the spring of 1939 this had given way to a 5,500-plane program.¹⁰⁵ The latter established a new objective of 178 heavy bombers, at the same time providing for the purchase of 188 attack bombers.¹⁰⁶

How completely the tables had been turned in the space of six months is illustrated by the reaction of the General Staff to this new program. It interposed no objection to the new figure for heavy bombers but protested that 188 attack bombers did not provide for adequate support of the ground forces. It disclaimed any desire to delay the expansion of the Air Corps but felt that this aspect of its plans deserved to be reconsidered, particularly since the Baker Board/Woodring Program strength of 2,320 aircraft, the previous goal, had allowed 300, and it had itself only recently contemplated the procurement of this quantity from heavy bomber funds.¹⁰⁷

The Air Corps Board, to which General Arnold referred the question, assured the General Staff that it saw "a probable ultimate need" to apply a much larger percentage of combat air strength than this figure indicated to direct support missions for ground troops. It made it clear, on the other hand, that the "chronological priority" of heavy bomber requirements and the fact that the attack bomber under development was not yet entirely satisfactory were good and sufficient reasons for it to recommend no increase in attack bomber procurement for the time being.¹⁰⁸ With this reply the General Staff was apparently content.

¹⁰⁴NA, RG 94, file AG 580 (3-31-26) (1) Sec. 3-A, memorandum from the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps to the Secretary of War, October 19, 1938.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, memorandum by Major St. Clair Streett to Col. Anderson, March 22, 1939, and Exhibit "A" thereto.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷NA, RG 94, file AG 580 (3-31-26) (1) Sec. 3-A, G-4 memorandum for Chief of Staff, April 7, 1939.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, memorandum for Chief of Staff from Chief of Air Corps, April 12, 1939.

¹⁰³Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-179.

Meanwhile, in connection with the expansion of the Air Corps, a special Air Board was appointed,¹⁰⁹ by a War Department order of March 23, 1939, to consider once more what fundamental policies should govern the tactical and strategic employment of the Army's air arm. The report of the Board asserted unequivocally that "the basis of Air Power is the bombardment airplane," and conceived of the basic mission of GHQ Aviation in the following terms:

To operate as strong offensive units for the application of Air Power from bases within the Continental United States or in our overseas possessions, or to exert such power as an element of expeditionary forces employed outside United States Territory. These forces will be required to extend the destructive effects of air operations over both land and sea to great distances beyond their operating bases . . .¹¹⁰

In its recommendations concerning the desirable general characteristics of Army aircraft the Air Board accordingly put a premium upon the long-range bomber with a ferrying range of as much as 3,000 miles, enabling air reinforcement to overseas garrisons and to South America ("hemisphere defense" was the current watchword), and to expedite concentration within the United States proper. Remembering the narrowly-averted fate of the pressurized-cabin, high-altitude bomber, the Board stressed the importance of energetic and continuous research and development.¹¹¹

The Air Board Report clearly conflicted with the principles set forth in the Joint Board's recent study on the limitation of development of Army bombardment aviation and evoked a proposal that it be submitted to the Joint Board so that the latter might supersede or modify the position it had taken.

¹⁰⁹Its membership consisted of the Chief of the Air Corps; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3; Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division; and the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force.

¹¹⁰NA, RG 94, file AG 330.2 (3-22-39), Report of the Air Board, September 15, 1939.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, Report of the Air Board, Section F.

The War Plans Division pointed out, however, that the Joint Board statement was so carefully qualified by such terms as "in the present situation" and "at this time" that its validity had automatically ceased in the circumstances now prevailing. It also conceded that a mistake had been made in submitting the problem to the Joint Board in the first place, since it dealt exclusively with the execution by the Army of its own missions. It could not, for example, conceive of the Navy Department submitting to the Joint Board the question of whether or not it should construct 35,000-ton battleships. "The whole matter," it believed, "should be allowed to drop out of the picture as a dead issue."¹¹²

XI

The position of the strategic bomber in Army aviation was now secure beyond challenge. Three long years of working at cross purposes had postponed its advent, however, and the total strategic bomber strength available to the GHQ Air Force in September 1939 consisted of the same 13 B-17's it had received for service testing two years previously.¹¹³

The problem of building up a strong and effective strategic bombing force remained to be faced, along with the myriad other problems posed by the large-scale expansion the Air Corps now began to undertake. Valuable time had been lost by the General Staff's lack of faith in and understanding of the new weapon, its reluctance to see the Air Corps as different in any way from the rest of the combat arms, and its constant and overriding concern for adequate air support of the ground forces. By its own guiding lights there were sound and justifiable reasons for taking those positions, but the con-

¹¹²*Ibid.*, War Plans Division memoranda of July 21 and August 8, 1939.

¹¹³"The Strategic Bomber," p. 106. The first B-17B's were completed in June 1939 but had not yet been assigned to operational units (*Collision, op. cit.*, p. 29).

sequences were lamentable and potentially dangerous.

There remains to consider the possible explanation for the striking change in the attitude of the General Staff toward the heavy bomber between 1935 and 1936. To be sure, the General Staff was not at any time enthusiastic, or even encouraging, in its stand on the proposals of the Air Corps, but it did, in general, allow itself to be persuaded of their value during what might be called the years of gestation, 1933 to 1935. In 1934, G-4 could express itself almost benevolently on the subject:

The tactics of an arm of the service depend to a great extent upon the weapons which they have available. Especially must this be true with respect to a recent and comparatively untried arm such as the aerial forces. To limit development of the airplane, which, with its armament, is the weapon of the Air Corps, would be to prevent advancement.¹¹⁴

After 1935, however, one proposal after another was rebuffed, as we have seen, on the grounds that it was "aggressive" in character, that no military requirement existed for it, that it meant augmenting the Air Corps at the expense of the other arms, or that it meant neglect of aircraft suitable for close support of ground troops. Underlying these reasons one can discern also, without great difficulty, that the General Staff was alarmed at the exceptional cost of the procurement programs that were proposed after 1935; that it was increasingly jealous of the

Air Corps' tendency to keep itself and the heavy bomber in the spotlight of publicity; and that it could foresee that the rising emphasis upon strategic bombing at the expense of ground support was inevitably leading to greater autonomy for the Air Corps and less authority over military aviation for itself.

Whether personalities played a role in the case is difficult to judge with certainty. It is not clear from the official records what General MacArthur's own views were on the problem during his term as Chief of Staff (1930-1935), but it is abundantly clear that all of the significant development projects that came to fruition had their inception in this period. General Malin Craig, his successor in the decisive and vital pre-war years (1935-1939), went to no pains to conceal his hostility toward the heavy bomber.

As we have seen, three valuable years were frittered away in controversy over whether the Army was or was not to have a strategic bombing force. It might well have had a substantial one by 1939, when the controversy was settled, but it did not, and it took two more years to create one. General Craig's own words are perhaps the most appropriate commentary upon this unhappy and avoidable state of affairs:

What transpires on prospective battlefields is influenced vitally years before in the councils of the staff and in the legislative halls of Congress. Time is the only thing that may be irrevocably lost, and it is the first thing lost sight of in the seductive false security of peaceful times. . . .¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (11-3-33) (1) Sec. 1, G-4 memorandum to Chief of Staff dated January 24, 1934.

¹¹⁵Quoted in Paul M. Robinett, "Observations on Military History," *Military Review*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 9 (December 1956), p. 40.

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NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

THE UTILITY OF MILITARY HISTORY

BY STEFAN T. POSSONY AND DALE O. SMITH*

MILITARY history serves a triple purpose: First, it is necessary for the strengthening of military morale, by providing examples of the nation's military valor and the ability of its armed forces to overcome hardships and difficulties. Any military force is dependent upon tradition to provide its motivating force, and this can only come from history, however imparted to the troops.

Secondly, military history is necessary for the proper functioning of military-civil relationships, as a method of familiarizing political and congressional elements as well as public opinion, with military problems. Such a familiarization is indispensable if the military shall be provided with the requisite legal, financial, and political backing and if they are to gain and maintain public confidence. To an extent, the recruitment of suitable personnel also is dependent on a proper understanding of military problems and requirements: an understanding which, in part, is conditioned by knowledge of military history.

Thirdly, military history is indispensable for effective organizational planning, the development of suitable strategies and tactics, the successful conduct of operations, and the accomplishment of most other military tasks. Military history should prove one of the most significant inputs into war games. Obviously, war games can be developed deductively, but it may be anticipated, in line with past ex-

perience, that such games will be more useful if they are based on real rather than imaginary historical examples. The combination of military history with war gaming techniques could be developed into the most powerful tool of military thinking.

To make such a combination work, military history must be given the benefit of an entirely new start. It must pass from generalization to detail, from parroting to original research, and from mythology to science. More attention must be given to lasting military lessons found in history, and less to the polemics of reputations. Above all, military history must evolve from catalepsy to animation and action.

Essentially, military history is a method of recording, analyzing and comprehending military experience and of elucidating, through examples, the nature of complex military problems. If history were not used, practically all military thinking would have to be of a deductive character based on untested premises. Moreover, military history is the only method presently known which, for purposes of broad planning, could take the place of operational analysis: because it must be clad in quantitative terms, the customary techniques of statistical evaluation often are inapplicable to qualitative and non-repetitive military problems. Indeed, history is the oldest form of operational analysis, at least if it is done properly. Statistical methods cannot be more than a supplement to historical analysis. Briefly, then, military history is the basis of creative military thinking.

In the past, the crucial role of military his-

*Dr. Possony, a Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University, is a trustee of the American Military Institute while Brigadier General Smith is the Institute's Vice President.

tory was acknowledged by most military organizations all over the world. The German army, for example, had the historical office integrated into the general staff of which it was one of the eight main departments. Frederick and Napoleon travelled with the works of Plutarch and Caesar in their baggage. Many of the really creative strategic thinkers, such as Moltke, Lee, Schlieffen, Foch, Wavell, Rommel, MacArthur, Patton, etc., were keen students of military history; and so was Stalin. Churchill not only is a student but one of the most outstanding writers of military history. The great Captain who is an historical ignoramus is an exception, if he exists at all.

Recent American trends have been to underemphasize history in favor of other political sciences. The almost deliberate ignoring of historical facts has led the social sciences into an impasse. So far as the military are concerned, the lack of interest in military history has had a negative influence on most military activities, including military education. It is characteristic of present practices that in a recent military exercise of which the writers have knowledge, a check list was used on which the origin of each type of information was marked: Series A was known from our own experience, Series B from logical analysis, Series C from assumption, Series D from intelligence, etc. History was not included even as one of the poorer sources of relevant information.

Lest these remarks be construed as too severe a criticism of U. S. practices, it must be pointed out that the science of military history has been on the decline even in countries which formerly were prominent in the field: Britain, Germany and France.

The decline of military history manifests itself in many ways:

In the first place, there has been a paucity of original, dependable and complete histories of most campaigns during the 20th century

and, in particular, lack of an over-all work on military history from antiquity to World War II or Korea. Histories that do exist display grave methodological faults and are written either as chronologies, with some annotation, or as personalized accounts. The truly significant military problems usually are slighted in favor of what could be called "surface dramatics."

Next, what passes as official military histories are products which, by necessity, are written in a non-controversial manner. These histories are subject to much vetoing and editing by high echelons. These histories serve as a useful purpose inasmuch as they provide a basic and coherent narrative but they rarely, if ever, penetrate to the true problems and solutions of military history.

Most, if not all, unofficial military histories written by private scholars are based on inadequate documentation. Moreover, they are often written in a popular rather than a scientific style, in the vain hope that in this fashion the book would sell better. The insufficiency in documentation is due (1) to inadequate funding of this type of research and (2) difficulty of access to documents because of classification, dispersal and disorganization of archives.

The education of officers throughout the American military establishment is impeded by lack of proper literature in the field of military history. This accounts, in part, for the wasteful over-reliance on trial-and-error procedure.

Books on military history which by some happy accident see the light of the day usually are not endowed with the maps, charts and other technical paraphernalia required for proper understanding. The cost price of military books is about double that of a literary text, yet the price of such books must be "reasonable." This economic "scissor" between cost and bearable price has all but killed military history.

While it is possible for any diligent student to acquire a generalized knowledge of recent military history, there are enormous gaps in the military historical literature. For example, there is no history of strategy, no history of tactics, no history of military organization, no history of operational planning, no history of intelligence, etc.

To give another example: After World War I, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a large number of historical treatises dealing with that war. The series was planned to comprise more than 200 volumes but remained incomplete. Still, the series is highly useful to any student of military history, even though most of the volumes deal only indirectly with military problems. Nothing of the kind was attempted after World War II. It would be interesting to know if any of these volumes are available in the libraries of our war colleges and how often they are being used.

This deplorable state of affairs must be ascribed to a variety of causes. On the one hand, the academic community is disinterested in military history and often is openly opposed to it. Consequently, there are barely any chairs on military history. The rare historian interested in the subject would write about it at the risk of his career. The U. S. has yet to produce a Jaehns, a Delbrueck or an Oman.

On the other hand, commercial publishers are confronted by the fact that military books usually do not sell to the break-even point. Consequently, they cannot publish serious military books. It is really a tribute to their patriotism that any books on the subject are published at all.

Foundations have so far refused, save for a few temporary exceptions, to finance research in military history. They usually are disinclined to support *any historical* research on any subject. They prefer to finance the other types of social science work, — those

which are based on quantitative methods, and on subjects dealing with hopes and aspirations rather than threats to the social fabric.

Lack of interest in the military establishment is perhaps the most fundamental cause why military history is neither properly funded nor adequately supported by documentation, and therefore has been withering on the vine.

It is true that recently the military services have been giving somewhat more support to military books. It is also true that some historians and private institutions have been keeping up the spirit, usually at considerable sacrifice. The decline of military history is perhaps a phase of the more broadly gauged decline of all types of historiography. People have become infatuated with "forecasting"; unfortunately they forget the eternal truth that "what is past is prologue."

It may be anticipated that as interest in history is rekindled, military history, too, will have its renaissance. However, it will be necessary to make available considerable funds, and to provide satisfactory access to military documentation. It would be advisable to establish chairs for military history at various universities and military schools,* to establish a center of military documentation with declassification procedures, and to recruit suitable historians.

In order to bring about such a situation, essentially two things are necessary: to open up private sources of adequate financing and to convince the American military establishment that the revitalization of military history is a necessity for the security of the United States. The motto of the American Military Institute is pertinent advice: *Historia mentem armet*—history *should* arm the mind.

*It is a revealing commentary on the situation that none of the War Colleges maintain chairs for military history. Even at the Academies, military history is a sorely "underdeveloped" subject.

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age. By Raymond L. Garthoff. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. 283 pp. \$4.50.)

Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age is a sequel to Dr. Garthoff's *Soviet Military Doctrine*, which was a penetrating history and analysis of the development of Soviet military thinking from the fall of the Czars to 1953. This latest book focuses attention primarily upon current Soviet defense organization and the basic doctrines upon which Soviet strategy is based.

Although Dr. Garthoff writes with authority and insight in the areas of strictly military matters, he possesses a deep and broad understanding of the social and political aspects of the Soviet regime. Consequently, he gives added value to the book as he relates military matters to the broad background of the Soviet system. This is most fortunate, because it is unrealistic to consider any national military system as a separate and distinct entity within any nation in which it exists. The military concepts and system of any nation are largely fashioned by that nation's history, social attitudes, geographic characteristics, and political philosophies.

In this connection his chapter on "The Role of the Military in Soviet Politics" provides a highly penetrating insight into the relationship of the military to the government and particularly to the Party. The author's analysis of the political forces and widespread intrigue involved in the ouster of Marshal Zhukov will be of particular interest to military and civilian readers who have an interest, not only in the military, but also in the fundamental power relationships that dominate the Soviet regime. While there were other extremely

important issues involved in Zhukov's dismissal, his bold effort to reduce the role of "military commissars" constituted his most clear-cut challenge of Communist ideology and organization. This assault by Zhukov and his associates on the political control system was a threat, in the eyes of the doctrinaire Soviet leaders, that jeopardized the grip of the Party over the military and thus could not be tolerated. In addition to the issue of political officials in the military line of authority, it is also clear that the swift manner in which the Soviet party hierarchy dismissed Zhukov reflected the built-in fear which the Soviet system has so long demonstrated against the threat of Bonapartism emerging as a counter-revolutionary factor.

At the present time, when there is such debate in this country over the question of massive retaliation and the degree to which emphasis should or should not be placed upon thermonuclear capability as a basis of our national strength, Dr. Garthoff's extensive discussion of Soviet nuclear concepts and doctrines is highly pertinent. The author discloses with extensive detail that Soviet military doctrine has rejected the extreme air-power view that thermonuclear assault will be final or even decisive. Basic Soviet strategy is clearly, as Dr. Garthoff relates it, a strategy based upon what, from the Russian point of view at least, are balanced forces. Repeatedly the thought is expressed in Soviet strategic doctrine that a great war cannot be won with atomic bombs alone and, as Zhukov stated, "air power and nuclear weapons by themselves cannot determine the outcome of an armed conflict." Zhukov's position in this matter is clearly reflected and supported by the official pronouncements of spokesmen for the

Soviet military hierarchy, and has been reiterated by Marshal Malinovsky, whom Khrushchev designated to succeed Zhukov.

It becomes clearly apparent from the author's text that the underlying concept of all Soviet military doctrine is that victory and war will not be dependent upon any single arm but, as Malinovsky recently told the graduates of the Moscow military academies: "Victory in combat will be achieved by the combined efforts of all the armed forces."

In view of the continuing issue of defense organization, and the advocacy by some United States military figures that this country should adopt an over-all high command in the form of a national general staff, the Soviet experience in defense centralization is of considerable interest. The Soviet defense organizational structure illustrates very clearly what U. S. opponents of a supreme high command system have so long held: that one element and one doctrine will inevitably capture and dominate a supreme general staff. It is clear from the evidence set forth by Dr. Garthoff that the conclusion is correct that "the general staff of the armed forces is the former army general staff, upgraded." There are many points of proof to substantiate this important feature of the Soviet military system, not the least of which is the very practical fact that in the hierarchy of the Soviet high command the Navy and Air Force chiefs rank thirteenth and fourteenth in standing after a dozen senior Army marshals and generals.

The western world has still failed to indicate by action in military policy that it has fully grasped the vast significance of the spectacular rise of Soviet sea power since the end of World War II. Dr. Garthoff's chapter on "Soviet Sea Power" gives added insight into the Soviet thinking which has resulted in a Soviet naval building program by which Russia has supplanted England as the world's second ranking sea power. The Soviets, with their awareness of history and keen appreciation of the strategic position of the free world, have quite correctly appraised the free world as an oceanic confederation bound together in peace and in war by sea lanes. The rise of Soviet sea power is not only a reaction to this strategic evaluation, but also is inseparably associated with the new Soviet emphasis upon commerce and trade as instruments of global aggression. It is clear that the Soviet leaders have read the inescapable lesson of history that no nation has ever become a great

trading power without a great sea power base to support such an endeavor.

Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age is unquestionably one of the most important military books to emerge since the end of World War II. It should be required reading for all who are associated with the formulation and application of United States policy.

J. D. HITTLE
Brig. Gen. USMC (Rtd)
Washington, D. C.

The Signal Corps: The Test (December 1941 to July 1943). By George Raynor Thompson, Dixie R. Harris, Pauline M. Oakes, and Dulaney Terrett. (*United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services.* Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1957. xv, 621 pp. Maps and illustrations. \$4.50.)

The second volume of the history of the Signal Corps in World War II begins its account with Pearl Harbor and ends with mid-1943, a detailed history based on extensive research in official sources which is not likely to be duplicated in our time or any later one. As one might have suspected from the climax of Volume I, the outbreak of hostilities brought a dampening of the research effort within the Signal Corps to create a new world of electronic communication by swamping the organization with pressing and almost inherently insoluble problems of procurement and supply. While research did not cease, it suffered from the urgency of freezing models sufficiently to get them into production, and the authors leave the implication that it suffered also from its administrative coupling with supply which continued throughout the period. The main themes of the volume then are mainly the exasperating grind to produce unprecedentedly complicated wire, radio, and radar systems in unheard-of quantity, and the struggle to train highly skilled men to operate and maintain the equipment with only the faintest shadow of a cadre of specialists in the huge, amorphous, nontechnical mass of manpower which the Signal Corps obtained with its indifferent priority. The best reading in the book comes with the descriptions of actual operations, but here one always feels the frustration of the Signal Corps itself, which desired but never achieved control of its own people in combat.

The writing in this volume is uneven. Occa-

sionally it is penetrating and gives a sense of the great forces gathering in the war effort. At other times the narrative is scarcely distinguishable from a spare parts list. Despite the undercurrent of pride in Signal Corps accomplishments which pervades the account, the reader finishes the book with the depressed feeling that the Signal Corps was gradually losing ground under the weight of its inescapable problems, the attacks of the haughty Army Air Force, and its inability to get direct access in army organization either to personnel in the field or to the Chief of Staff. Its position subordinate to the Services of Supply hurt its other functions. While "nine tenths of all Signal Corps effort was now centered on some phase of supply" the remaining tenth made the supply function more difficult at the same time it seemed of great importance to the Chief Signal Officer. The climax of these frictions was the retirement of Major General Dawson Olmstead as Chief Signal Officer. The authors do not hesitate to state that the War Department "fired him." This "provided what seemed an easy solution, which in reality bypassed the real organizational difficulties." As the volume ends in midstream, the authors assert that Olmstead had "cleared the ground and sown the seed from which not he but his successors would gather a good harvest."

A. HUNTER DUPREE

University of California, Berkeley

The War Against Japan, Vol. I: The Loss of Singapore. By Maj. Gen. S. Woodburn Kirby, with Capt. C. T. Addis, RN, Col. J. F. Meiklejohn, Col. G. T. Wards, and Air Vice-Marshal N. L. Desoer. United Kingdom Military Series, History of the Second World War, edited by J. R. M. Butler. (London: HMSO, 1957. 568 pp. Maps, sketches, appendices, index. 55s. New York: British Information Service, 1958. \$10.22.)

"Defeat," wrote Admiral Mahan, "cries aloud for explanation; whereas success, like charity, covers a multitude of sins." This injunction by the greatest of all American naval writers provides the theme of this first volume in the British official 5-volume series of *The War Against Japan*. The authors could have selected no theme more fitting, for their story deals with the opening months of the war in the Far East, when defeat followed Allied defeat in rapid succession, when the Japanese tide engulfed all of Southeast Asia, much of the Pacific and threatened even to sweep over

India, Australia and as far east as Midway and Hawaii.

For Americans, the early days of World War II are symbolized by the attack on Pearl Harbor and by the heroic but vain defense of Guam, Wake, Bataan and Corregidor. For the British that period has a meaning no less tragic. It was then they lost Singapore and Hong Kong, Malaya and Burma—disasters unparalleled in the long history of the British Empire. It is this defeat, especially the loss of Singapore, that cries aloud for explanation, and this is the task the authors of this volume set for themselves. They have succeeded admirably. With complete honesty but never without charity they have told the story of British defeat in the Far East, pointing out the errors where they see them and giving praise where it is due. The result is an admirable study that holds more lessons for soldiers and statesmen than all the epics of redundant victory.

In no volume of the British series published to date do the differences between the British and American approach to the history of World War II emerge so clearly. The British have wisely placed their historical section on the Cabinet level and armed the historians with broad authority to provide a survey of events "from an inter-Service point of view." The Americans, on the other hand, have organized their historical effort for World War II by Service, with separate and independent sections each with a different approach and program for covering its operations during the war. Both systems have their strong and weak points, but the war against Japan was uniquely a joint effort involving all three Services. No single Service history could do justice to this war, and admirable as are the volumes thus far published by each of the Services, none has the merit of providing an over-all view of the war. Only an inter-Service history, written perhaps on the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, could have done that. It is here that the British have succeeded better than we have for theirs is truly an inter-Service history, written on the highest level and with complete access to the records of all the Services.

The advantage of such an approach is abundantly illustrated in the present volume. Its five authors represent all three Services, with the greatest representation (three out of five) going to the Army which bore the brunt of the fighting during the opening days of the war. Praise and blame are accorded the Services fairly and justly,

and the role of each is assessed in terms of its contribution to the campaign.

In one respect, this volume like its predecessors in the British series is disappointing. It is undocumented and has neither bibliography nor a note on the sources used. The reader is assured that the volume is based on official records and that there exists a classified copy of the manuscript with footnotes. But this is of little help to the serious student of military history faced with conflicting accounts in other volumes, or with controversies that he can resolve only by evaluating the evidence himself. One wonders also how much of the present work was drawn from secondary sources. Much the same ground has been covered by the Australians, the New Zealanders, and the Americans in their own official volumes. To what extent were these utilized by the British authors? What did they accept, what did they reject, and why? Surely, there is no reason for failing to cite secondary and unofficial sources, if only for the convenience of the reader who may wish to read further in the subject.

In all other respects, this is an excellent work. The maps are both numerous and clear, placed in the text in such a manner as to be most convenient and useful for the reader. Illustrations, though conventional, are entirely adequate, as are the appendices and index. As the first of five volumes, the present work holds out the promise of a valuable and important series.

LOUIS MORTON
Washington, D. C.

Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942. By G. Hermon Gill. [Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series Two, I.] (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957. xviii, 686 pp. Illus. 30s.)

The official Australian history of World War II, *Australia in the War of 1939-1945*, has been universally received as an excellent series. The first of two volumes dealing with naval operations is no departure from that standard. It is well written, comprehensive, and accurate. G. Hermon Gill, its author, spent twelve years at sea as a merchant marine officer and seventeen ashore as a journalist before being called into service as a Lieutenant Commander in the Naval Intelligence Directorate.

Australian naval operations fall into two categories. The first is the activity of individual vessels as integrated units of British squadrons and the second is the activity of vessels in home wa-

ters. Although most of the overseas operations of Australian vessels were in the Mediterranean, the blue Australian Ensign also flew in the Eastern Pacific, and Caribbean, as well as the North and South Atlantic. Since Australian vessels participated in most of the major British operations after June 1940, the first two-thirds of the book is a description of British sea power in adversity. Here are accounts of HMAS *Sydney's* sinking of the Italian cruiser *Bartolomeo Colleoni*, the Battle of Cape Matapan, the bloody fighting around Crete, and the convoy runs to Tobruk where the Australian "Scrap Iron Flotilla" distinguished itself. Here, too, are descriptions of lesser known naval operations like the support of the fighting in British Somaliland and the occupations of Iraq and Iran.

Mr. Gill also describes the careful preparations to protect the troop convoys carrying the Australian Imperial Force to the Middle East. Similarly, he describes the precautions to prevent depredations by German raiders in the Southwest Pacific. It was in action against the raider *Kormoran* that the *Sydney* perished—a loss which Mr. Gill thinks was largely caused by poor judgment on the part of the *Sydney's* captain.

It is the last third of the book which will most interest American readers for here is described the Royal Australian Navy's operations during the first four months of the Pacific War. Since here too the Australian vessels operated in consort with British, Dutch, and American units Mr. Gill has written the history of the naval defense of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies in considerable detail. Because the Australian vessels operated more with the British and Dutch than the Americans this section complements Samuel Eliot Morison's *Rising Sun in the Pacific*. Taken together, the two volumes will give the student an excellent description of the fighting in the East Indies.

This reviewer was struck by occasional questionable uses of sources. For instance, Mr. Gill has followed the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee's out-of-date *Japanese Naval and Shipping Losses During World War II* By All Causes in assessing Japanese losses instead of the newer and more reliable compilation by the Far East Command's Military History Section, *The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II*. On page 535 he engages in a lengthy discussion of the loss of the Japanese transport *Tsuruga Maru* in which he takes exception to Admiral Morison's

statement in *Rising Sun in the Pacific* that the vessel was probably sunk by the American destroyer *John D. Ford*. The first edition of Morison did so state but the later ones, which should have been available to Mr. Gill, agree with him that credit should go to the Dutch submarine *K-18*.

Mr. Gill makes only limited use of Japanese material—but except for the Morison volumes and the studies prepared at the Naval War College by Commodore Richard W. Bates this criticism can be leveled at most writing on World War II Pacific naval operations. This results both from a shortage of competent Japanese translators and bureaucratic stupidity. When the Japanese Naval Ministry records were brought to this country in 1945 for exploitation by the Washington Documents Center they were carefully arranged and indexed. But following the disestablishment of the Center the records were transferred to the National Archives and in the process were rearranged so as to make the index useless. And no record was kept of the rearrangement! It is much to the credit of Roger Pineau that he was even able to find the necessary reports for use in the Morison series. Thus Mr. Gill cannot be heavily censured for his lack of Japanese documentation.

These deficiencies are minor and understandable and detract only slightly from the overall excellence of Mr. Gill's work. It is a book which should interest any student of World War II at sea and is indispensable to the understanding of the activities of the first four months of the Pacific War.

K. JACK BAUER
Division of Naval History
Department of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

Strategic Intelligence Production. By Brig. General Washington Platt, USAR (Ret.). (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. 302 pp. \$4.00.)

In the all too scanty literature of scholarly thought on the principles and processes of intelligence work, General Platt's thoughtful review of this vitally important activity stands out as a real contribution. It is about equally divided in emphasis between elements of methodology, consideration of special problems, and exhortation.

As a methodological treatise it is probably the best contribution to appear since Sherman Kent's "classic," *Strategic Intelligence for American*

World Policy (1949). As a survey of problems it ranks with Roger Hilsman's *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions* (1956). It certainly stands head and shoulders above such emotional outbursts as those characteristic of Colonel Elias Townsend's *Risks: the Key to Combat Intelligence* (1955).

General Platt's exhortation lies in the direction of attracting more good young brains into the exasperating and exhausting labors of the U. S. intelligence services. No one has yet attempted to do this in a book so persuasive, and yet one which does not gloss over the factors that often make this peculiar business just as infuriating and discouraging as it is vital to the survival of our country.

The most controversial part of this work (as the general repeatedly admits, e.g. on pp. 36, 41, 44-5, 61) is his attempt to establish "Nine Principles of Intelligence corresponding to Clausewitz's Principles of War." Some students, especially those without formal military training, may find these rather heterogeneous. The first six (Purpose, Definitions, Exploitation of Sources, Significance, and Cause and Effect) will find most readers in general agreement with the author. But when his seventh proves to be "Spirit of the People," one has the impression that the door is being opened wide to a whole new type of substantive, rather than procedural, data. If "any sound intelligence estimate must recognize . . . the Spirit of the People"—then why shouldn't the eighth "principle" be Steel Production, and so *ad infinitum*? Yet, as said above, General Platt disclaims all finality for his list, and it is obvious that the most important principle in codifying principles for any discipline is that somebody must start somewhere with them. To the present reviewer's knowledge no responsible student of the intelligence process has attempted this before.

General Platt's chief contribution to the stern task of improving a most fallible process of estimating and forecasting is to be found in the extraordinary freedom with which he moves in a variety of disciplines. Unhampered, apparently, by his many years of active military service, he seems perfectly at home in the physical and social sciences, in mathematics (including the all-important field of statistics), in logic, and so forth. Yet constructive evidences of his long experience in military intelligence are also observable throughout. The result is a rigorous examination of many diverse methodologies and their com-

parison to that of strategic intelligence production. From this process any number of fresh insights may be derived.

This unprejudiced ease of movement, moreover, has far wider implications. Not merely methodology is involved, but "principle" of a kind transcending those enunciated by the author. General Platt's *Strategic Intelligence Production* could be the Magna Carta of the intelligence community. It could mark the beginning of freedom for both command and staff alike from those petty and self-defeating attitudes towards each other that have made so much difficulty between them in the past. By laying down even an inchoate body of intelligence principle, couched in language understood by command, the author lays the foundation for a set of rules and a common denominator for communication. If and as these rules are refined, worked on, and found workable, they can lead to better intelligence practice and so to growing confidence by command in its intelligence staff. Conversely it may produce for the intelligence community a verbal pattern intelligible to command.

And the potential usefulness of this book extends also beyond the specialized individuals mentioned above. Few people realize how widely applicable to the "decision-making" of ordinary life are the intelligence procedures described in this book. By following them and the principles given with them, anyone can find the simplest activities involving "estimating," "forecasting," or the "collection, processing, and use" of information systematized for him. These insights are not just for specialists in intelligence matters—the book may well find a much larger market, and it deserves to.

GEORGE BELL DYER
The Dyer Institute
New Hope, Bucks County
Pennsylvania

Preliminary Inventory of the War Department Collection of Confederate Records (Record Group 109), Number 101 of the Preliminary Inventories of The National Archives, Compiled by Elizabeth Bethel. (Washington: The National Archives, 1957. ix and 310 pp. Apply.)

For the first time in the more than 90 years since the close of the great American conflict, the Federal Government has published for public distribution an inventory to the bulk of the rec-

ords of the former Confederate States of America. Those important Confederate Government records in the National Archives which have not been classified and made a part of this record group are referred to in the *Introduction* and their location given.

The collection of some 2750 volumes of record books of various Executive, Legislative, and Judicial offices are described in adequate detail in this inventory and identified by the "Chapter" and "Volume" numbers originally assigned to them and long familiar to users of these records. No separate entry number is assigned to them in this inventory.

All groups of manuscripts not part of the record books mentioned above have been assigned entry numbers in the inventory which are adequate for source identification in documented writings.

Entry 193 is the large and invaluable compilation of individual military service records known as the "Carded Records" consisting of copies of references made to individuals in official documents such as muster or pay rolls, hospital and prison records, parole lists, etc. This entry alone encompasses 5,474 cu. ft. of archival material.

The Table of Contents indicates the organization of the inventory into the records of the Confederate Government, the Office of the Secretary of War, and the various staff departments of the Army. Following these are the records of the various military commands (Departments and Armies) and the records of military units and local commands by States.

Such records of other Confederate Departments as belong to this Record Group follow the Army records. These include various records of the Treasury, Post Office, Navy, Legislature, and Judiciary. Then follow miscellaneous records of the Confederate and State governments.

The inventory concludes with Confederate service records, prisoner, oath, and parole records, and various records relating to the administration and processing of these records, particularly during the period of the publication of the *Official Records*.

This inventory is an invaluable contribution to historical research on the Confederacy and should go far toward making for better and more comprehensive scholarship in the field. The appearance of the inventory only too clearly exposes the inadequacy and limitations of the former arrangements for becoming acquainted with these records.

By this one single act, the National Archives has made a notable contribution to the approaching Civil War Centennial, has furnished a long over-due essential tool for scholarly investigation and writing, and has exposed the inadequacy (source-wise) of much that has been written and is still being written on the war.

What is now needed most urgently is a complementary volume, a union inventory of similar material, both official and private in origin, located in State archives, colleges and universities, private and public libraries, and in the holdings of various historical and patriotic organizations. Perhaps the National Archives, the National Historical Publications Commission, or the Civil War Centennial Commission will fill this void.

RALPH W. DONNELLY
Charlotte, North Carolina

The Great Rebellion: The Emergence of the American Conscience. By Earl Schenck Miers. (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co., 1958. 369 pp. \$6.00.)

The dedicated knights of all the Civil War Roundtables and their like should provide a ready-made audience for this well written and moving book—if they are willing to expand their horizons beyond the fields of battle tactics to the larger vistas of the causes and implications of the American Civil War. Earl Schenck Miers, a learned and thoughtful man, has obviously read widely—if not quite exhaustively—in the secondary treatments of the period and saturated himself in the atmosphere of the sources. He has distilled his reading and thinking into an impressionistic, evocative treatment. The effect is somewhat like that of a brightly colored patchwork quilt.

There are three central points in the pattern: one week in the confused and despairing winter of 1860-61, and two April days, one in 1861 and the other in 1865. From these points the author ranges rather widely into backgrounds and consequences. About one-half of the book deals with the secession winter, centering on Buchanan, old, weak, and supine in Washington, and Lincoln, endowed with clarity of understanding, in Springfield, Illinois. But it sweeps on to include scores of people, such as Mary Chesnut, Major Robert Anderson and Captain Abner Doubleday, and Horace Greeley and Fernando Wood in Charleston, New York, and other cities. The climax, turning on Buchanan and Lincoln, is the decision

not to surrender the fort at Charleston, even at the cost of war.

The second section deals with the generally familiar events that led to the firing on Sumter and the reactions, North and South, to that irrevocable step. The third traces the road to Appomattox. The author's method stresses brief, graphic episodes, treated with penetrating insights. At times the reader may have the impression that he is turning over the pieces in a file of contemporary newspaper clippings—not the least interesting form of reading.

Everyone here and now should take special note of the quotation, on page 30, of Lincoln's comment on the effect of racial injustice in diminishing the power of the United States to exercise moral leadership in the world. Unfortunately, those who need it most—the cynical demagogues who seek opportunistic political advantage in exploiting the prejudices of the most frustrated strata of society—are unlikely to read and less likely to heed it.

It is interesting to note the book's employment of the old-fashioned, quasi-official title for the Civil War. One wonders whether the widespread use, with Northern acquiescence, of the pro-Confederate, unhistorical, and anti-Constitutional term, "War Between the States," may not have subtly encouraged the effort to reverse the outcome of the Civil War. If so, the return to "War of the Rebellion" might be salutary.

WOOD GRAY
George Washington University
Washington, D. C.

Baa Baa Black Sheep. By "Pappy" Boyington (Colonel Gregory Boyington, USMC, Ret.). (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958. 384 pp. \$4.50.)

This is the autobiography of a wild and controversial Marine Corps "Ace" of World War II. Sweeping air battles, first with the Flying Tigers and then with the Marines, suddenly terminate in his rigors as a prisoner of war with daily beatings, constant hunger and—a saki binge. Apparently alcohol was Boyington's number one enemy and the final chapters chronicle his post-war fall from hero to bum and then the climb back to respectability.

HUBARD D. KUOKKA
Major, USMC
Washington, D. C.

Rocket. By Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. 185 pp. \$6.00.)

Guided Weapons. By Eric Burgess. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. 247 pp. \$5.00.)

Rockets, Missiles, and Moons. By Charles Coombs. (William Morrow and Company, 1957. 248 pp. \$3.75.)

Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert is another one of the many British military men who have turned author after retirement from active service. In *Rocket*, after a brief survey of the early uses of rockets in warfare, Joubert devotes the greater part of the book to the development and use of the V-1 and V-2 by the Germans and the British defense against these weapons. The last few chapters are devoted to an examination of the "many factors which affect the development of the defenses of the free world in the years to come." This is a tall order for anyone to fill in a mere forty pages and Joubert lacks the knowledge and objectivity to put in perspective the political, economic, social, and other factors which, in conjunction with the new weapons, are changing our world.

The author conceives that for some time to come the international scene will be dominated by the rocket missile. He believes that the ICBM's and related weapons constitute the "Great Deterrent" to warfare and that the West must achieve and maintain technological superiority over the Soviets. In analyzing the military forces of the future he visualizes the British Navy as eventually consisting chiefly of submarines, light aircraft carriers, and guided missile ships; the Air Force will operate the pilotless ground to air missile, transports, and communication aircraft. To the Army he assigns a mobile police force, a home defence force, and control of ballistic missiles, "which after all, are only very long-range guns." In the best British tradition of fair play, the veteran airman contends that since the "Royal Regiment of Artillery formed the first rocket batteries" early in the nineteenth century, common decency, as well as logic, insists that it should handle the rocket of the late 20th century! But eventually, he recognizes, the reliance on the same weapons may well bring the three services together into a single unified service. In this regard, the British experience is similar to our own.

It is perhaps the surest sign of our times that books on technical subjects, particularly those dealing with weapons, cannot remain current for more than a short time—often only months. It must be largely for this reason that there has been such a tremendous proliferation of technical periodicals in recent years. Much of *Guided Weapons* by Eric Burgess was almost out of date as soon as it was printed. The obvious answer will be to issue frequent revisions of the books—perhaps annually. In this field this would not be too often.

Burgess is one of the better writers engaged in informing the public on this important subject. In this book he discusses the technical fundamentals on which guided weapons are based and traces their historical evolution as close to date as possible. In the main, the discussion concerns the German effort in World War II and American progress since then. Very little is available about the experience of other countries, although the Soviet Union has not been exactly backward in missile development. There is not much more about British missiles, and the author tells us there is a "tremendous scarcity of information concerning British guided missile work." This, of course, would be an understatement if applied to the Soviet Union. The iron curtain that has been drawn about so much technical information because of military security is the real *bete noir* with which technical writers have to contend. But Burgess has listed the sources of his information at the end of each chapter and does not pretend to more knowledge than he has. This is all to the good and encourages trust in his results.

Rockets, Missiles, and Moons by Charles Coombs is of a different genre from Burgess' far more comprehensive and useful work. It is a simplified, popularized approach and contributes nothing to the literature of the subject. On the other hand, it may well attract more readers than Burgess.

ALFRED GOLDBERG
Arlington, Virginia

The Seizure of Political Power, by Felix Gross (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958, pp. 398, index, \$6.00).

Professor Gross' most recent contribution is a socio-historical study of the seizure and transfer of political power by violence. Although utilizing

the Russian revolutions since 1825 as the hard core of the study, Gross also includes empirical case studies of coups in Latin America, Egypt, China, Italy and other countries.

Approaching his subject from the point of view of its sociological, ideological and organizational aspects, the author thoroughly analyzes both the seizure of power by violence and the struggle against seized power. Written with the strict attention to detail that has characterized all his writing, Dr. Gross methodically divides his study into four parts—the general theoretical framework, the development of Russian revolutionary struggle and tactics, the Communist theory of struggle and tactics and counter-strategy and tactics directed against seized power. His chapter on Democracy and violent change deserves special consideration.

Gross's book will never become popular reading but it should merit special consideration from everyone interested in preventing revolutions and politics by violence. As a study of the Russian revolution it should become a valuable reference book. It is strongly recommended for the military library.

JOHN E. KIEFFER
Col. USAF (Ret)

The Yanks Were There. By Thomas B. R. Mudd, editor. (New York: Vantage Press, 1958. 258 pp. \$5.00.)

On 20 June 1917, the U. S. War Department announced solemnly that purveyors of Coca-Cola and other soft drinks would be permitted to set up booths within the two-mile "dry zone" surrounding the sixteen new Army cantonments of World War I. For the first time in American and perhaps even world history, the soldier was to be officially denied the consolations of alcohol.

Such forgotten items out of our military past are the stuff of this day-by-day account of World War I events. The serious researcher will find many of them too trivial, and others too permeated with the none-too-subtle Governmental press-agency of that day. But such items have their value for anyone interested in background bits culled from the *Official Bulletin*, issued daily from Washington by the Committee on Public Information.

A good chronological table of events and helpful statistical summaries are contained in the appendices.

LYNN MONTROSS
Washington, D. C.

New Developments in Army Weapons, Tactics, Organization, and Equipment. By Captain Marvin L. Worley, Jr. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co. 1958. Pp. 261. Index. \$3.50.).

Not since the days of Genghis Khan has the world faced a threat comparable to that which it faces today, and never has the free world placed its hopes so completely on the ability of the military man to master quickly new machines, skills, and techniques. A thorough understanding of the capabilities of new equipment and new organizations is always a *sine qua non* of the military leader, and help in gaining this understanding is the purpose of Captain Worley's book.

This book is written for a military audience. It is a factual, straightforward account that outlines, within the limits of security restrictions, many of the beliefs, hopes, and new developments presently under consideration or recently adopted by the Army. Much of the information has previously appeared in print. Captain Worley's contribution has been to assemble and present such a diversity of knowledge in one place.

The volume touches upon major equipment developments as well as reorganizations in each of the combat arms and sketches the tactical concepts involved for deploying the reorganized and newly-equipped forces. In his presentation, the author has generally followed the three basic requirements of any tactical unit—the ability to move, shoot, and communicate—and he has arranged his chapters to include work being done by each of the technical services to improve these capabilities.

Though presenting no original thought or new ideas, this is a useful book. It should prove enlightening to those who have been unable to keep abreast of the changes taking place in our military establishment. It indicates the extent of the challenge facing the young officer who must master and make ready to fight with newly-developed equipment. It should prove reassuring to the general public, which in addition to bearing the expense must learn to live and survive under the clouds of war that such developments portend.

C. P. SEMMENS
Lt. Colonel, U. S. A.
DCS OPS
Washington, D. C.

An End to Valor. By Philip Van Doren Stern.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958. Pp. 418.
Index. \$5.95.)

Few periods of American history are so filled with tragic drama as the last days of the Civil War, the period from March through May 1865. The main events are familiar: the deeply moving phrases of Lincoln's second inaugural, the firing of Richmond and the Confederate retreat, Lee's last desperate efforts to break through Grant's lines, the surrender scene at Appomattox, Lincoln's dreams and portents of doom, the assassination and the trial of the "conspirators," the flight of the Confederate government and the arrest of Jefferson Davis, the grand review and mustering out of the victorious armies in Washington. These are oft-told tales but in this volume the various threads of the larger story are brought together with literary skill.

This thoughtful synthesis is based on thorough research. The author, whose previous work in the field of Lincolniana provide an excellent background, consulted not only the main printed sources but also manuscript and archival records. From a vast array of documents he has culled material of personal and dramatic interest, much of which will be enlightening even to the specialist. On rare occasions, however, enthusiasm gets the better part of judgment and the irrelevant and non-essential are included. The smooth flowing text is unencumbered with footnotes, but the author sensed the need for some form of documentation and he worked out an erratic and confusing system of giving the main sources for each page at the back of the book.

The author not only presents a narrative of events, he tries to tell us what those events meant. Hence there is a brief summary of the effects of the Civil War on strategy, tactics, and weapons. On the large significance of the war he sees irony in the contrast between motives and results. His main thesis is that the Civil War represented the triumph of a mechanistic, industrial society over a way of life humanistic and agrarian. Even before and during the war the seeds of the new order were springing to life, and the author provides a setting for the denouement by including plots and counterplots—various money-making schemes—in his story. As long as Lincoln lived, while the physical struggle lasted, these elements were held in check. But when the fighting was over, the money changers took over the temple of national government unabashed. Speaking of the rise of

the robber barons in the post war era, "These shameless plunderers emerged from war in which the Confederates had fought bravely to defend a bad cause . . . while the men of the North had fought just as bravely for a good cause, which they now forgot. . . . And so did valor end in corruption for the North and the South alike."

HARRY L. COLES
The Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio

The Cat with Two Faces. By Gordon Young.
(New York: Coward McCann, 1957. Pp. 233.
4 illus. \$3.00.)

The Face of Death. By Capt. Jack Evans,
Ernest Dudley. (New York: Wm. Morrow,
1958. Pp. 220. \$3.75.)

While these two books share in common the non-conventional approach to warfare, they are vastly dissimilar in scope and character. Gordon Young's "Cat" could well serve as a useful reference source in the methodology, organization, and risks in international espionage. Dudley's "Face," on the other hand, although it is obviously trying to deliver some message, ends up as a not even passably good adventure story.

"Cat" recounts the World War II activities of Mathilde Belard Carre, French woman who aspired to the status of Mata Hari. Organizer and operator of a successful resistance intelligence unit, next agent and Judas for the German Abwehr, and finally a source of information for the British, Mathilde Carre presents a most interesting case study in intelligence work. The story of her complicated life, the analysis of her motives, and the skill behind her operations are all ably depicted by the author, in a manner not only intriguing, but designed to teach.

All professionals in the field of intelligence should read and study the "Cat." Here is the very essence of the field laid bare and described in cold terms with no effort to editorialize or influence the reader. The author's treatment is not only commendable but obviously based on deep practical experience or study in intelligence work.

The best that can be said of "Face" is that its counterpart can be read in any pulp magazine for a quarter. Basically, the struggle of a malcontent to adjust to organized living, the war merely serves as a backdrop to the play. The adventures described lack reality and contribute nothing of value for the military reader.

JOHN E. KIEFFER

SHORT REVIEWS

ACHESON, DEAN G.: *Power and Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. 137 pp. \$3.00.)

The four William L. Clayton lectures delivered at Tufts University, which discuss "Power today: Its location, nature and growth," "The military requirements of a free world," "The need for strength at the center," and "Political precepts for coalitions of free states."

BRASSEY'S ANNUAL, the armed forces Year-book, edited by Rear Admiral H. G. Thursfield. (New York: Macmillan, 1957. 440 pp. \$9.50.)

The sixty-eighth edition of this standard collection of stimulating essays on defense policy, strategy and the development of armed forces and their weapons in all countries. As always, essential reading for all those concerned with military affairs.

COOMBS, CHARLES: *Wings At Sea* (New York: William Morrow, 1958. 223 pp. \$3.75.)

A brief elementary illustrated introduction.

FURNISS, EDGAR S., JR. editor: *American Military Policy, strategic aspects of world political geography*. (New York: Rinehart, 1957. 494 pp. \$6.50.)

A valuable compilation of readings taken from journals, which should be in the hands of everyone concerned with current military thought and its evolution. The editor has written a stimulating introduction to each subject covered: "Political geography and the commitments of American military power;" "Involvements of military organizations and personnel in foreign policy making;" "The evolution of American strategic military doctrines;" "Problems of continental defense, Use of American military power for the pacification of weak allies: The case of Latin America;" "Pooling American military power in security organizations: The case of NATO;" "American military power and the defense of weak, uncommitted states: The case of the Near and Middle East;" "Control and Limitation of permanent peace world organization;" "Military Concepts: Limited War, and Graduated Deterrence and Massive Retaliation." The bibliographic suggestions for further readings are also most helpful.

GOGO, JEAN L., editor: *Lights on the St. Lawrence* (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd.,

and the Ryerson Press, 1958. 303 pp. \$5.00.)

An entertaining anthology of material on the St. Lawrence River and its part in American and Canadian history as seen by contemporary writers from Cartier to the present day.

HOWARD, MICHAEL, editor: *Soldiers and Governments; nine studies in civil-military relations*. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957. 192 pp. 21 Shillings.)

Based on a series of lectures at King's College, University of London, the countries discussed are Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, Spain, Latin America, and the United States. The last essay is by D. W. Brogan. "Introduction: The Armed Forces as a political problem," by the editor, lecturer on war studies, at King's College, is *must* reading for every scholar in this field.

KINGSTON-McCLOUGHRY, Air Vice-Marshal E. J.: *Global Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1957. 270 pp. \$4.50.)

The author of *The Direction of War* has written another thought-provoking study of modern strategic concepts. He points out "that though emphasis may change history is the indispensable link in the strategic pattern." A writer whose thoughts provide insights into the past, present and future.

PATTERSON, GARDNER AND EDGAR S. FURNISS, JR.: *NATO, a critical appraisal, a report on the basis of an international conference held at Princeton University, 1957*. (Princeton University Conference on NATO, Princeton, 1957, 1958. 107 pp. Apply.)

Especially valuable for students of coalition warfare.

REINGOLD, NATHAN, compiler: *Records of The Coast and Geodetic Survey* (Washington: The National Archives, 1958. 83 pp. Apply.)

National Archives Preliminary Inventory No. 105, describing the records of the oldest civilian scientific agency of our government.

RUSH, C. W. (COMDR, USN), W. C. CHAMBLISS AND H. J. GIMPEL: *The Complete Book of Submarines* (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co., 1958. 160 pp. \$4.95.)

A fully illustrated, popular history covering events as recent as the Nautilus' passing under the North Pole.

SERVICE CENTER FOR TEACHERS OF HISTORY:

This service center of the American Historical Association has prepared a series of historiographical studies which contain a concise summary of publications reflecting recent research and new interpretations in a particular field of history. The following of the twelve so far published are most pertinent for military historians:

Civil War and Reconstruction, by Hal Bridges (Washington, 1957. 22 pp. .50¢); *New Interpretations in American Foreign Policy*, by Alexander De Conde (Washington, 1957. 31 pp., .50¢); *The American Revolution, a review of changing interpretations*, by Edmund S. Morgan (Washington, 1958. 20 pp., .50¢); *The South in American History*, by Otis A. Singleterry, (Washington, 1957. 39 pp., .50¢); and *The Middle West* by Harry R. Stevens (Washington, 1958. 25 pp., .50¢).

STEWART, OLIVER: *Danger in the Air* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. 194 pp. \$6.00.)

A history and description of various types of air disasters in terms of their contributions to progress in aviation.

WILKINS, THURMAN: *Clarence King, a biography* (New York: Macmillan, 1958. 441 pp. \$7.50.)

Congratulations are in order to our former Institute Secretary and Associate Editor for his outstanding study of the life of one of the most colorful and brilliant Americans of the nineteenth century. Based upon thorough research and containing writing of the caliber one would expect from an Assistant Professor of English at Colum-

bia, it justly deserves the success it has received to date.

FICTION

ARMSTRONG, THOMAS: *A Ring has no End* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1958. 477 pp. \$4.95.)

A well-written novel portraying the history of Russia, through the career of a noble Russian family, from the Crimean War to the defeat of the White Russian armies in 1920.

GREEN, PETER: *The Sword of Pleasure* (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co., 1958. 315 pp. \$3.95.)

An historical novel in the form of the memoirs of the retired dictator of Rome, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, who died in 78 B. C. Of interest to the classical scholar and to those interested in civil-military relations.

MARS, ALISTAR: *Fire in Anger* (New York: William Morrow, 1958. 222 pp. \$3.50.)

First published in England as *Atomic Submarine: A story of tomorrow in 1957*, this novel projects the adventures and exploits of the commander of an atomic submarine in war with Russia and Communist China sometime in the future.

RIGG, ROBERT S.: *War—1974* (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1958. 304 pp. \$5.00.)

Lt. Col. Rigg, USA, describes an imaginary war in 1974 based upon known facts, on weapons now being used by our armed forces, plus machines of warfare on the drawing boards or undergoing tests.

RECENT WRITINGS ON MILITARY HISTORY

Compiled by R. W. DAVIS, D. M. O'QUINLIVAN and G. J. STANSFIELD

Edited by D. M. O'QUINLIVAN

General

"Army dividends to the American taxpayer."
Army Information Digest, Jul 1958. (1800 ff.)

W. BRANCH-JOHNSON. *The English prison hulks*. London: Christopher Johnson, 1958. 205 pp. 18s. (1776-1857.)

"Brave rifles; Army tradition, honors and history."

Armor, Jul-Aug 1958. (3d Armored Cavalry Museum at Fort Meade.)

LAWRENCE E. BUTLER AND ROBERT G. YERKS. "Make history live." *Armor*. Jul-Aug 1958. (Teaching of military history to ROTC classes.)

"Changing jobs of the U. S. Navyman." *All Hands*, Aug 1958. (Chart of ratings, 1775 ff.)

ANDREA CUCINO. "La strategia difensiva in montagna nel passato e nel futuro." *General Military Review* (Paris), Jan 1958.

*Received for review.

- STEPHEN V. GRANCAY. *The new galleries of Oriental arms and armor*. New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1958. 28 pp. \$0.50.
- EDGAR M. HOWELL. "Hall of military history." *Army Information Digest*, Jul 1958. (New exhibits in the Smithsonian Institution.)
- EDWARD HUGHES, ed. *The private correspondence of Admiral Lord Collingwood*. London: Navy Records Society, 1958. 348 pp. 45s.
- G. H. HURFORD. "Sixty years of 'Jane's.'" *ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, Journal*, May 1958. (*Jane's fighting ships*, 1898 ff.)
- D. P. KIRCHNER. "American harbor defense forts." *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Aug 1958. (Pictorial; 1672 ff.)
- T. H. MCGUFFIE. "The lance in battle." *History Today*, Aug 1958.
- . "The sword in warfare." *History Today*, Jul 1958.
- J. MEISTER. "Soviet seapower; inshore naval forces." *The Navy* (London), Aug 1957. 1856 ff.)
- BERNARD C. NALTY. "Without prejudice or partiality." *Leatherneck*, Sep 1958. (Marine enlisted fitness reports, 1877 ff.)
- OSCAR PARKES. *British battleships Warrior 1860 to Vanguard 1950; a history of design, construction and armament*. London: Seeley, 1958. 701 pp. £6 6s.
- PSYWAR SOCIETY, *Bulletin*, v. 1, no. 1, Jan 1958. Apply to P. H. Robbs, 8 Ridgway Road, Barton Seagrave, Kettering, Northants, England. 10s per annum.
- MAURICE K. SCHIFFMAN. "Army ROTC." *Military Review*, Sep 1958. (1862 ff.)
- JAMES C. TILY. "The Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy and the Corps device." *Military Collector and Historian*, Summer 1958. (1867 ff. with background.)
- ANNA M. WALLER. *Dogs and national defense*. Washington: Office of the Quartermaster General of the Army, 1958. 72 pp.
- JOHN M. YUMOTO. *The Samurai sword*. Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, Co., 1958. 191 pp. \$3.75.

Prior to 1700

- KENNETH FENWICK, ed. *The Third Crusade; an eye-witness account of the campaigns of Richard Coeur-de-Lion in Cyprus and the Holy Land*. New York: Philip C. Duschnes, 1958. 164 pp. \$5.00.
- HERBERT JAMES HEWITT. *The Black Prince's expedition of 1355-1357*. Manchester, Eng.;

- Manchester University Press, 1958. 226 pp.
- AUGUST C. KREY. *The First Crusade; the accounts of eye-witnesses and participants*. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1958. 300 pp. \$4.50.
- D. H. PENNINGTON. "Cromwell and the historians." *History Today*, Sep 1958.
- MICHAEL ROBERTS. *Gustavus Adolphus; a history of Sweden, 1611-1632*. Vol. 2. 1626-1632. New York: Longmans, 1958. 861 pp. \$16.50.

Eighteenth Century General

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

CIVIL WAR CENTENNIAL DINNER

The Civil War Centennial Commission and the Civil War Round Table held a joint meeting and dinner to signalize "*Centennial Night*," the first of a series of programs to be scheduled throughout the country. Nearly 300 persons attended the kick-off dinner at the National Press Club in Washington, D. C., on November 11, 1958. The distinguished audience enthusiastically applauded Bruce Catton's stirring address. Catton's theme was that the war was "the terrible price paid . . . for our progession from a small nation to a great one." He felt that the war's tragic quality justified today's renewed interest and study and "even the continuing flood of books." The eminent editor said the Civil War "unites us by a sharing of a great and mystical experience." Both the sharing and the tragedy are symbolized by the monuments in the Nation's Capital. Catton called the sight of Abraham Lincoln's memorial linked by Memorial Bridge to the Arlington home of Robert E. Lee "the most magnificent bit of symbolism in American history."

Karl S. Betts, Executive Director of the Centennial Commission, introduced those at the head table. Conrad L. Wirth, National Park Service head, spoke of the Service's *Mission 66*, designed to restore and preserve many of the Civil War battlefields. District of Columbia Commissioner Robert E. McLaughlin announced the members of the D. C. Centennial Commission. William S. Paley of the Columbia Broadcasting System introduced the speaker of the evening, Pulitzer Prize-winner Catton. Others at the head

table included Congressman William M. Tuck, Colonel J. Gay Seabourne, Dr. Bell I. Wiley, Rear Admiral E. M. Eller, Brig. General A. C. Welling, and Albin L. Aubinoe.

1958 JOINT SESSION AMI-AHA

We went to press just prior to the joint session of the American Military Institute with the American Historical Association. Subsequently, during proof reading, this brief space was available for additional news notes. The meeting was a decided success. Some two hundred persons attended in the Grand Ball Room of the Mayflower Hotel, Sunday morning, 28 December 1958. As the question period indicated, the papers were attentively followed: one by Dr. Louis Morton, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, on "Strategic Realities in the Pacific Theater of War;" and the other by Prof. N. H. Gibbs, All Souls College, Oxford University, on the Mediterranean Strategy in 1942-44." Chairman Stetson Conn, also of OCMH, introduced the speakers and the program title, "New Perspectives on World War II." The official commentators were Herbert Feis, Institute for Advanced Study, and Colonel G. A. Lincoln, United States Military Academy. Dr. Morton's finding that the presence of the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor, deliberately stationed there as a deterrent force, was the major *casus belli* of the Japanese War, elicited, perhaps, the most comment both at the meeting and in the public press. It is hoped to present the papers and comments or a summary in a later issue.

AMI TRUSTEES MEETING: RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT

At the meeting of the Board of Trustees of the American Military Institute, held at the Ordnance Association, Washington, D. C., 15 September 1959, the resignation of Colonel T. N. Dupuy as president of the AMI was accepted with regret. The president found it impracticable to continue in office due to the transfer of his activities and residence to Las Vegas, Nevada. Dr. James D. Atkinson of Georgetown University accepted appointment to the vacancy.

The outgoing president was very active during his tenure of some eighteen months in efforts to obtain foundation funds for the AMI and on membership drives. With the generous cooperation of Mr. Mel Rider of the *Army-Navy-Air Force Register*, Colonel Dupuy obtained central city office space badly needed by the officers of the Institute. Concurrently, from the slender funds the Trustees were induced to appropriate for clerical hire, so that it was possible to reorganize the records and administration on a sounder footing.

The Trustees concluded their brief session by authorizing a modest monetary award for the best article in each quarterly issue, and setting the date for the annual meeting. In view of the short time remaining in December for the preparation and mailing of notices the annual meeting was set for 30 January 1959.

THE EDITOR'S MAIL BAG

Among the items passing across the editorial desk during the quarter only the following can be mentioned in the space available.

Liddell Hart. In a pleasant Christmas message, dated 16 December 1958, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart informs us that he is "just in process of moving to a new home,

overlooking the Thames Valley," from his former residence of Wolverton Park, Buckinghamshire. During 1958, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York City, issued a new edition of Liddell Harts' classic on *Sherman*. Captain Hart relates that the book "had a particular influence on the development and employment of the German armoured forces," and Generals von Blomberg and von Reichenau, "jointly translated it . . . for the use of German officers." Furthermore, "Patton, too," states Hart, "was another keen student of the book and told me when I first met him in the war that he had spent a month's vacation in Georgia and the Carolinas studying Sherman's operation with this book in his hand." That sounds like the characteristic Patton. With the many Civil War buffs springing up at every crossroads, Praeger should have good results with the new edition of *Sherman*.

Admiral Hayes on Du Pont Papers. Dr. Charles W. David, Director of the Longwood Library, Kennett Square, Pa., requests us to announce that the Longwood Library is sponsoring a proposed edition of the selected correspondence of Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont for the years 1861-1865. The edition is in preparation by Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, USN (Ret.). Du Pont commanded the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, and led the memorable naval attack against Charleston, S. C., in 1863. The Director of the Longwood Library welcomes information on materials which may exist elsewhere. Admiral Hayes, whose address is 1970 Fairfax Road, Annapolis, Md., would also like to obtain the addresses of any descendants of the following naval officers of the Civil War period with whom Du Pont corresponded: Samuel Barron, George S. Blake, Horatio Bridge, Franklin Buchanan, Thomas G. Corbin, Andrew H. Foote, L. M. Goldsborough, Andrew A. Harwood, Dun-

can H. Ingraham, Sidney Smith Lee, John Lenthall, George A. Magruder, John S. Missroon, William B. Shubrick, Christopher R. P. Rodgers, Stephen D. Trenchard, Thomas Turner, and William C. Whittle.

Ney. A long-time member of the Institute, Colonel Virgil Ney has made an intensive study of methods of guerrilla warfare in various parts of world during recent years. An analysis of his findings is incorporated in "Guerrilla War and Modern Strategy," in the Spring number of *Orbis*, published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania. He holds that since the end of the second World War the incidence of guerrilla activity has been on the increase throughout the world. Ney cites the struggles in Greece, China, Viet Nam, Malaya, the Philippines, Egypt, Oman, Ifni, Aden, Kenya, Cyprus, Algeria, Hungary, and most recently, in Cuba. The problem of guerrilla warfare, he believes, will continue to harass the West for a long time to come. In passing, Colonel Ney mentioned that he has some three score pieces of antique muskets and swords in storage which he will lend gratis for display purposes to established institutions.

Dyer. Drs. George and Charlotte Dyer have issued the fourth edition (1958) of *The World Analyst*, a 200 page loose-leaf system for analyzing and classifying source materials on international topics and situations. Thoroughly indexed for geographical and topical entries, it is said to permit "rapid storage of articles, charts, graphs, and reports in their logical folders. The system, it is stated, "eliminates the necessity of indexing each article." The Dyers may be addressed at Box 111, R.D. 2, New Hope, Bucks County, Pa.

KENNETH P. WILLIAMS

In the death of Kenneth P. Williams on 25 September, 1958, the American Military

Institute lost a member and the world of letters an outstanding Historian. His unfinished, seven volume work, *Lincoln Finds a General*, has had four volumes published, and the fifth is reportedly in the hands of the publisher. The four volumes, based for the most part on the *Official Records of the War of the Rebellion*, have been an outstanding contribution to Civil War history.

Dr. Williams, who was born in Urbana, Ohio, on 25 August, 1887, won fame as a mathematician before beginning to write his history at the age of 57, after thirty-five years devoted to mathematics. Grote and Hodgkin came late to history after business careers, as did Schliemann to archaeology, but Williams was probably the first professional mathematician to devote his last years to writing military history. He was not an arm chair historian, however. During World War I, Kenneth Williams, after service on the Mexican border as a lieutenant in the Indiana National Guard, went to France as a captain, and became Chief of Staff of the Thirty-Eighth Division, Indiana National Guard. During World War II, he was commanding officer of the 113th Quartermaster Regiment and Divisional Quartermaster.

Dr. Williams received his A.B. degree in 1908 from Indiana University, and his M.A. in 1909 from the same institution. In 1912 he received his Ph.D. in mathematics from Princeton. Among his writings were *Calculations of the Orbits of Asteroids* and *The Mathematical Theory of Investments*. In 1907 Williams worked as an astronomy fellow at Lowell Observatory in Flagstaff, Arizona. He was married in 1920 to Ellen Laughlin Scott, a former member of the Indiana University English faculty, who died in 1956. (RWD)

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

Type manuscripts on one side of 8½ x 11 inch bond paper. Leave ample margins and double-space throughout, including footnotes and quotations to be set in reduced type. Footnotes should be double-spaced on sheets separate from the text and placed after the last page of the article. In matters of style and footnote citations the latest edition of Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers* . . . (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) is to be followed. For points not covered adequately therein the latest edition of *A Manual of Style* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) should be consulted.

PLEASE REPORT CHANGES OF ADDRESS

Members and Subscribers are earnestly requested to NOTIFY the AMI Secretary of changes of address. This is important since postal regulations forbid forwarding of second class mail. Furthermore we (The A.M.I.) must pay postage on each undeliverable copy of *Military Affairs*, which is returned to us, often with the subscriber's new address furnished on a post office department sticker. We then remail his copy to him, after attaching the required postage. *Military Affairs'* second class mail classification applies *only* to the Baltimore, Md., post office, since it is printed in that city and mailed *direct* to members and subscribers.

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